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Ritter: Ritter: Your Lips Are Moving...but the Words Aren't Clear:

Your Lips Are Moving... But the Words
Aren't Clear:1 Dissecting the Presumption
that Jurors Understand Instructions
Judith L. Ritter
Do not those unintelligible words uttered by thejudge in the presence of the
jury resemble the talismanic words of Word-Magic?2
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years appellate courts in the United States have relied upon a
presumption that jurors understand and follow a trial court's formal jury
instructions.3 The judiciary's steadfast reliance on this premise frequently takes
on an imperative tone. For instance, the Supreme Court has stated, "we adhere
to the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system oftrial byjury that
jurors carefully follow instructions."4 Because courts subscribe to the notion that
questioning the validity of this presumption poses a threat to the survival of our
system of justice, in all but a few exceptional situations, appellate courts are
unreceptive to claims that jury instructions were incomprehensible.5

* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. I would like to
thank Phyllis Bookspan, Robert L. Hayman, Jr. and Michael Wiseman for their very
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also wish to thank Teresa Ganim
and Jennifer Nash for their excellent research assistance.
1. John Lennon & Paul McCartney, I'm Looking Through You, on RUBBER SOUL
(Capital EMI Records, Ltd. 1965).
2. JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1930).

3. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225,234 (2000); Francis v. Franklin, 471
U.S. 307, 324 (1985); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979), abrogatedby Cruz
v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987); see infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
4. See Francis,471 U.S. at 324; see also Parker,442 U.S. at 76 n.7 (stating that
"[t]he 'rule'-indeed, the premise upon which the system ofjury trials functions under
the American judicial system-is that juries can be trusted to follow the trial court's
instructions"); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) (noting that "[o]ur theory
of trial relies upon the ability of ajury to follow instructions").
5. See, e.g., Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234; Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 312 (7th Cir.
1993); see J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts,Legislatures,and Commissions
FollowingEmpiricalResearch on Jury Instructions, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 155, 157,
164-67 (1991); Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the
LanguageofJury Instructions,66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1086-99 (2001). See generally
J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits ofa Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Courtand
Psychology, 66 IND.L.J. 137, 144-50 (1990) (exploring the Court's reluctance to accept
psychological research regarding juror behavior).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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The presumption that delivered instructions are actually understood by
jurors is curious; it is not supported by an adequate foundation. It cannot be
supported by historical experience. 6 Empirical data directly refute it.7 And,
given the legalistic wording of most jury instructions,' common sense would
suggest that the presumption ought to be that lay persons would have great
difficulty in understanding them.9
This Article examines and questions the jurisprudence that turns a blind eye
to evidence that the jury instruction presumption is ill-founded. While the
presumption applies in any jury trial, this Article emphasizes the particular
injustice associated with its application in criminal cases. Evidentiary
presumptions' ° in criminal cases are subject to the rigorous requirement that they
reflect "accumulated common experience" both in the past and the present." A
presumption based upon anything less violates an accused's right to due process
of law. 2 Therefore, it is particularly troubling that in criminal cases, the
presumption regarding the efficacy of crucial jury instructions remains baseless.
Part II of this Article traces and documents the judiciary's stubborn
adherence to the presumption that instructions are understood and followed.' 3
In this context, Part H first discusses the curious use of the terms "presumption"
and "assumption" as if they were synonymous" and then suggests that neither
term is truly accurate.' 5 Part II then describes the extent to which the

6. See infra notes 143-73 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
8.
See, e.g., AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
UNDERSTANDABLE 199 (1982) (containing instructions given to jury in Nevada murder

trial defining express malice as "that deliberate intention unlawfully to take awaythe life
of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof");
see also Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language

Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1306, 1324 (1979) (describing the difficulty jurors have with legal terminology).
9. Ironically, I was summoned for jury duty while writing this Article. While
waiting in the jury room I, along with other potential jurors, was asked to complete a
short biographical questionnaire. The form was self-explanatory and quite simple, yet,
we were shown a videotape in which a judge provided detailed, kindergarten-like
instructions as to how to complete the questionnaire. I could not help noting that jurors
were presumed to understand complex legal instructions, but were presumed not to
understand how to complete the form. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, I was not
selected for a jury.
10. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
11. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 844 (1973); see also Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463,467 (1943).
12. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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presumption dominates the judiciary's review of poorly drafted jury
instructions' 6 and highlights the judicial view that the presumption is vital to the
jury trial system.' 7 Part H also examines the nature of the presumption: whether
it is analogous
to evidentiary presumptions,' whether it is rebuttable and by what
9
means.'

Part IHexplores five possible bases for the jury instruction presumption:
legal precedent, history, logic and rationality, empirical evidence, and policy.
That Part reveals the lack of solid legal precedent for the presumption.20 It also
argues that the history and development of trial by jury offers no support."
Additionally, Part Ill shows that the presumption satisfies neither rationality nor
empirical tests.22 Finally, in Part I I argue that it is far less impractical than
thought, and far more just to discard this presumption.23
Part IV suggests that a new, well-grounded presumption about juries and
instructions could someday replace the present one. Part IV argues that a proper
presumption should only be adopted when new pattern instructions are drafted,
redrafted perhaps and pass empirical testing.24
Justice is not advanced by the judiciary's reliance on an unsupported and
false presumption. Part V advocates suspending the presumption that jurors
understand instructions2 5 and urges the judiciary to recognize that the viability
of the jury system is not dependent on the continuation of this unjustifiable
premise."6 At least until new and tested instructions become widely used, the
presumption should not be used by courts as an excuse to ignore empirical
evidence demonstrating that a particular instruction was most likely
misunderstood. The Article concludes with an examination of the problem
presented in the unique context of a death penalty trial and condemns the
continued use of a jury instruction presumption that shields from scrutiny
incomprehensible instructions given to juries in capital cases.

16. See infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.

17. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 66-120 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 66-120 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.

21. See infra notes 143-72 and accompanying text.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

173-212 and accompanying text.
213-33 and accompanying text.
234-59 and accompanying text.
261-66 and accompanying text.
267-72 and accompanying text.
273-81 and accompanying text.
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II. THE JURY INSTRUCTION PRESUMPTION
In this Article, the phrase "jury instruction presumption" is used to express
the idea that our judicial system subscribes to a rule that takes for granted that
jurors understand and follow instructions. Before considering the crucial
question of whether such a notion has legal authority, or rational, historical or
empirical bases, this Part explores the precise nature of the "presumption," and
how it is called into service by the courts.
A.

"Presumption," "Assumption " or Something Else?

When referring to the fundamental concept that jurors follow instructions,
courts use the words "presumption" and "assumption" as though they were
synonymous.28 In its plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph29 the Supreme
Court proclaimed that "[a] crucial assumption underlying [the] system [of trial
by jury] is that juries will follow the instructions given them .... 9,3o In Weeks
32
v. Angelone3 the Court stated, "A jury ispresumedto follow its instructions.
Within the same paragraph one might find both terms used as though they were
entirely interchangeable. In its opinion in United States v. Olano 33 the Court
recognized "the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their
instructions," citing for authority language in an earlier opinion34explaining, "we
presum[e] that jurors... follow the instructions given them.

28. Compare Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 (1985), and Parker v.
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979), abrogatedby Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186
(1987), with Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000), Gacy v. Welbom, 994 F.2d
305, 313 (7th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Brown, 983 F.2d 201, 202 (1lth Cir.
1993).
29. 442 U.S. 62 (1979), abrogatedby Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
30. Id. at 73 (emphasis added); see also Yount v. Maddock, No. 00-17432, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 17214 (9th Cir. Aug. 16,2002); United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824,
839(7th Cir. 1967) (referring to "the assumption of thejury system thatjurors understand
and follow instructions on the law").
31. 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
32. Id. at 234 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,
336 (1998); Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993); Whitney v. Horn, 280
F.3d 240, 257 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 607 (6th Cir.
2000).
33. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
34. Id. at 740 (alteration in original) (emphasis added); see also Thomas v. Peters,
48 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (supporting the
presumption thatjurors follow their instructions with reference to case holding that there
is an assumption that they do).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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In actuality, in both the legal and non-legal worlds, "presumption" and
"assumption" have different meanings with varying consequences. Moreover,
an examination of references to the jury instruction presumption and/or
assumption suggests that neither term is appropriate.
Presumption, in the more or less non-legal sense, is "an attitude or belief
dictated by probability [or] the ground, reason, or evidence lending probability
to a belief."35 In law, the word "presumption," often misused,36 means "a legal
inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven
existence of some other fact or group of facts."37 This might best be termed an
"evidentiary presumption."3
Evidentiary presumptions are fairly common.39 Simply put, a necessary fact
may be presumed by the trier of fact upon sufficient proof of a related fact or set
of facts.' Typically, a state4' or the federal legislature writes a presumption into

35. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 932 (9th ed. 1983).
36. See generally Michael H. Graham, Presumptions-More Than You Ever
Wanted to Know and Yet Were Too Disinterestedto Ask, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 431, 436
(1981) (highlighting the "general confusion" in presumption terminology); Charles V.
Laughlin, In Support ofthe Thayer Theory of Presumption,52 MICH. L. REV. 195, 195209 (1953) (describing the various meanings attributed to the term "presumption").
37. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (7th ed. 1999).
38. Presumptions are utilized in both civil and criminal cases. In federal civil
cases, their use is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 301. See infra note 40. Though
recommended by the Supreme Court, a proposed Rule 303 addressing the use of
presumptions in criminal cases was not adopted by Congress. See infra note 176. The
role of presumptions in criminal cases has been limited by several key Supreme Court
decisions. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 318 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979); County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-58 (1979); see also
infra notes 40, 173-77 and accompanying text.
39. See generally Charles Collier, The Improper Use of Presumptions in Recent
Criminal Law Adjudication, 38 STAN. L. REV. 423, 425-26 (1986); Leslie J. Harris,
ConstitutionalLimitson CriminalPresumptionsas an Expression ofChangingConcepts
ofFundamentalFairness,77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 308, 317-31 (1986) (tracing

the evolution of the use of the evidentiary presumption and its implications); Shari L.
Jacobson, Mandatory and Permissive Presumptions in Criminal Cases: The Morass
Createdby Allen, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1988).
40. Sadly, the law of presumptions and their use cannot truly be "simply" stated.
In the civil context, when a party proves a particular, or what is referred to as a "basic"
fact, another "presumed" fact will be assumed and the burden to produce evidence
disproving the presumed fact shifts to the other party. See FED. R. EVID. 301. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, in civil cases, once the party against whom the presumption
is directed offers evidence to rebut the presumption, the presumption disappears (or
"bursts") and the burden of persuasion as to that presumed fact stays with the party who
sought to use the presumption. See id. This is known as the "bursting bubble" or Thayer
theory of presumptions. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 336-37, 339 (1898). See generally Harold A. Ashford
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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the criminal code by incorporating it into the proof requirements for certain
forms of prohibited conduct. For example, Title 18 of the United States Code
makes it a crime to knowingly transport obscene matters in interstate or foreign
commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution."2 The same section provides
that the transportation of two or more obscene publications or articles or a
combined total of five publications and articles creates a rebuttable presumption
that the material is intended for sale or distribution.4 3 Pursuant to the
presumption a jury is instructed that upon proof that a defendant transported two
or more (or a combined total of five) obscene publications or articles, the jury
may presume that it was for the purpose of sale or distribution.
An assumption is "[a] fact or statement taken for granted."" In law there
is a key connection between presumptions and assumptions. In the law of
presumptions, when a basic fact (fact 1) is proven, a presumed fact (fact 2) is

& D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions,Assumptions andDueProcessin CriminalCases:
A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 169 (1969); Laughlin, supranote 36, at 20911. A conflicting theory, originated by Professor Edmund M. Morgan, see I EDMUND
M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 33-35 (1954), is that the presumption
remains in the case and the party against whom the presumption is offered has the burden
to persuade the trier of fact to reject the presumed fact. Id.
The law of presumptions in criminal cases is impacted by a defendant's
constitutional right to have each element of every offense proven by the prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1975); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,368 (1970). In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979),
the Supreme Court ruled that a statutory presumption may not relieve the state of its
burden to persuade the trier of fact of each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt.
See id.at 523. In that case the Court struck down an irrebuttable mandatory presumption,
pursuant to which, upon proof of the "basic fact," a jury was required to find the
presumed fact. See id. at 517. Later in Francisv. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), the
Court amplified its Sandstrom holding and ruled that even a rebuttable mandatory
presumption, where a jury would be required to find the presumed fact unless the
defendant persuaded it to reject it, would violate a defendant's right to due process. See
id. at 318. Thus, Sandstrom and Francisprohibit statutory presumptions that direct the
jury to find an essential fact regardless of whether the presumption allows for rebuttal.
After proof of the basic fact, a presumption may merely allow the jury to find a presumed
fact without additional evidence if persuaded by the government to do so.
41. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 361-A (West 2002) (establishing
a presumption that one in recent exclusive possession of stolen property is guilty of the
theft or robbery); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3932 (2002) (establishing a presumption in the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code that the lessee of rental property intends to deal with the
property as his own if he fails to return the property in a timely fashion and either signs
the lease agreement under an assumed name or fails to respond to demands for the
property's return).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (2000).
43. See id.
44. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 120 (7th ed. 1999).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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assumed to exist.45 In other words, when a specified fact is proven, the law
allows the trier of fact to take for granted the existence of another fact; the
presumed fact. Thus, if we use our earlier example, under federal law when the
transportation oftwo or more obscene publications or articles or a combined total
of five publications and articles is proven, it may be assumed that the material
is intended for sale or distribution. Since the law is clear that in criminal cases
there must be a rational connection between the proven and presumed facts,'
assumptions should likewise not be called into use in the absence of that rational
connection.47
Actually, the idea that jurors understand and follow instructions is neither
a presumption nor an assumption. When courts assert a crucial assumption or
necessary presumption that jury instructions are understood and followed, they
most likely mean to describe a principle or starting point for our system of trial
by jury.48 It is far less likely that they mean to describe a concept that fits the

45. See FED. R. EviD. 301; see also Leo H. Whinery, Presumptions and Their
Effect, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 553, 555 (2001) (discussing the Uniform Rules of Evidence
provision that defines a presumed fact as "'afact that is assumed upon the finding of a
basic fact"').
46. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
47. Several commentators have distinguished presumption from assumption by
reference to the law of burdens of proof. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 40, at 173;
William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric ofInnocence, 70 WASH. L. REv. 329,403 (1995). They
_ point out that presumptions lay the burden of production upon the party against whom
the presumption operates. In contrast, assumptions allocate the burden of persuasion.
Thus, Laufer mentions those who advocate a change to an assumption (rather than
presumption) of innocence since the concept is designed to place the burden of
persuasion upon the prosecution. See Laufer, supra, at 403.
48. The term "presumption" is likewise misused in the "presumption of
innocence." The concept embodied by the presumption of innocence does not fit a
presumption model. It cannot be said that when an individual is accused of a crime and
the jury is allowed, or in fact required, to presume innocence it is because logically and
empirically those accused are usually innocent. To fit the model, the presumption would
suggest that experience and logic dictate that in the majority of cases criminal defendants
have been wrongfully accused. While the cynical might agree that such a connection is
rational, most, despite numerous examples of innocents being convicted, would deny its
rationality in the run of cases. Indeed, what sort of barbaric or Kafkaesque system would
ours be if it were based upon a true presUmption that most of those accused had done
nothing wrong. In fact, the required pre-trial probable cause determination flies in the
face of a true presumption of innocence. In reality the presumption of innocence is more
a governing principle of criminal procedure designed primarily to allocate burdens of
proof and persuasion, see Ashford & Risinger, supra note 40, at 173 (arguing that better
name is "assumption" of innocence because the device allocates the burden of
persuasion), because the Constitution has been interpreted to require that the prosecution
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
However, the burden allocation is not, as it must be for evidentiary presumptions,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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model (proof of basic fact allows assumption of presumed fact) for legal
presumptions.
49
B. JudicialReliance on the Jury InstructionPresumption

The expectation that trial jurors can and do follow instructions is expressed
in countless appellate decisions.5" Appellate courts cling to this presumption in
several contexts. Most often the courts are responding to a litigant's complaint
that a court's instruction cautioning a jury to disregard or limit its consideration
of a piece of evidence was insufficient to protect the litigant's rights.5 The
complaint is that despite an instruction to do so, jurors cannot purge their
memories of inadmissible testimony,5" nor can they consider evidence for one
purpose and not another.5 3
In a somewhat different context, the presumption is also offered in response
to a claim that difficult or incomprehensible instructions54 interfered with ajury's

supported by an empirical rationale. Cf Laufer, supranote 47, at 403-19 (arguing that
the principle is better termed an "assumption" of innocence and that an assumption of
innocence should have significance independent of burden allocation and should be
conveyed to a jury as an assumption of factual innocence that they must use as a lens
*through which to view the facts of the indictment and trial and the introduction of various
pieces of evidence). See also Graham,supra note 36, at 445-46.
49. Having already explained that courts refer interchangeably to ajury instruction
presumption or assumption and that there are varying uses and misuses of the term
"presumption," for simplicity's sake, and because it seems to be favored by courts and
commentators, this Article will refer to the jury instruction presumption.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,740 (1993); Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307, 324 (1985); United States v. Burton, No. 94-00080, 1996 WL 690155, at
*4 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 1996); Gacy v. Welbom, 994 F.2d 305, 312 (7th Cir. 1993). See
generallyTiersma, supra note 5, at 1088 (pointing to a presumption by appellate courts
that jurors understand their instructions).
51. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987); United States v.
Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1998).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1184 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11 th Cir. 1997).
53. See, e.g., Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211; Linwood, 142 F.3d at 425. The
question also arises in somewhat different, but closely related contexts such as when a
jury is instructed that counsel's remarks are not evidence, see, e.g., United States v.
McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1189 (7th Cir. 1998), the jury is instructed not to speculate
about an unexplained circumstance, see, e.g., United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573,
1577 (11 th Cir. 1993), or when the jury is instructed to acquit a defendant it finds to be
insane without consideration of the societal consequences, see, e.g., Shannon v. United
States, 512 U.S. 573,585 (1994). All of these contexts are similar in thatjurors are asked
to clear their minds of information or ideas or, at the very least, to not allow this
information to influence their fact-finding.
54. Occasionally the claimed problem lies with the comprehensibility of a trial
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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ability to render ajust verdict." Because ajury's role is to deliver a verdict after
applying the law to the jury's factual findings," the claim is that the jury's failure
to comprehend the court's instructions will seriously interfere with the proper
fulfillment of the jury's function." Except for an accidentally correct result, the
failure of a jury to understand instructions is likely to prevent the delivery of
justice."
Whether the claim involves a jury's inability to follow or to understand
instructions, the appellate courts respond with the same refrain: the law
presumes that jurors follow their instructions.59 Before exploring the

court's response to questions posed by juries concerning the instructions. See, e.g.,
Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 229-30 (2000) (describing a defense objection to the
trial court's responding to a question concerning the meaning of an instruction by
directing the jury to reread the instruction).
55. See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 703-04 (7th Cir. 1993); Gacy, 994 F.2d
at 308-09.
56. See Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895); cf infra notes 150-55
and accompanying text (discussing phenomenon of colonial American juries deciding
questions of both law and fact).
57. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 70 A. 850, 850 (Pa. 1908) (emphasizing that
"[t]he charge should be sufficiently explicit to enable thejuryto applythe law to the facts
of the case... and, when the trial judge has not succeeded in delivering instructions on
the law in such a way that they will be understood by the jury, his charge is inadequate
... ."); ROBERT G. NEELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRrriCAL LOOK AT A
MODERN MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 23 (1979) (arguing that "[a]
technically correct charge which is misunderstood by its audience.., is as effective as
no instruction at all in guiding jurors to a correct decision in the case").
58. See generally John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on
GuiltyPleasto Aid CriminalJurorComprehension,39 AM. CRlM. L. REV. 1187, 1214-15
(2002) (claiming that "[a criminal] defendant convicted by a confused jury has been
deprived of due process"); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science
Teaches Us About the Jury InstructionProcess,3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589, 589
(1997) (concluding that defendants cannot be assured a fair trial if jurors cannot
understand their instructions). Present day capital punishment laws draw a fine line
between requiring individualized sentencing and prohibiting arbitrariness. See infra
notes 180, 275-76 and accompanying text. See generally Jose Felipe Anderson, When
the Wall HasFallen: Decades ofFailurein the Supervision of CapitalJuries, 26 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 741,756-77 (2000) (explaining evolution of sentencing discretion in capital
cases). This makes the capital jury's responsibility particularly challenging and clear
instructions crucial. See McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1997)
(stressing that in capital cases juror confusion regarding legal instructions can result in
violation of important constitutional rights).
59. Compare Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 585 (1994), and Ashker v.
Class, 152 F.3d 863, 871 (8th Cir. 1998), with Gacy v. Welbom, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th
Cir. 1993). Of course, there are exceptions. In the case ofjurorsfollowinginstructions,
there are times when a court will conclude that the cautionary or limiting instruction asks
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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justifications for this premise, let us examine the various ways the concept is
expressed.
The three principal Supreme Court cases invoking and routinely cited as
authority for the presumption are Parkerv. Randolph,6" Francisv. Franklin,6'
and Richardson v. Marsh.62 The following are tastes of the Court's expression
of the jury instruction presumption:
A crucial assumption underlying [the] system [of trial by jury] is that
juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. Were
this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and
even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal
conviction because the jury was improperly instructed.63

too much of the human mind and cannot be followed. The most frequently cited example
of this is the Bruton doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1124
(8th Cir. 1998). In Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that it was
unrealistic to assume that a jury could be relied upon to disregard the incriminating
confession of a co-defendant in assessing the guilt of a defendant. See Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). See generally Judith L. Ritter, The XFiles: Joint
Trials,Redacted Confessions and Thirty Years ofSidesteppingBruton, 42 VIL. L. REV.
855, 862-72 (1997) (describing the evolution of the Bruton doctrine). Even prior to
Bruton Judge Learned Hand was highly skeptical of the ability of jurors to adhere to a
limiting instruction. See United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956);
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). In Nash, Judge Hand
described an instruction on the limited use of hearsay as a "recommendation to the jury
of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else."
Nash, 54 F.2d at 1007; see also United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 551 (11th Cir.
1994) (finding that the presumption fails when jurors display a willingness to disregard
instructions). However, even Bruton was narrowly construed by the Court in Richardson
v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), in which Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
largely justified the narrow construction by reference to the presumption that juries
follow their instructions. Id. But see Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195 (1998)
(limiting Richardson'slimitation of Bruton).
In the case ofjurors understanding instructions, see Mitchell v. Gonzales, 54 Cal.3d
1041, 1051-55 (Cal. 1991) (relying on empirical studies and concluding that pattern jury
instruction given on proximate cause was confusing and conceptually misleading).
60. 442 U.S. 62 (1979), abrogatedby Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
61. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
62. 481 U.S. 200 (1987). In addition to Parker,Francisand Richardson, see, for
example, Gray, 523 U.S. at 195, and Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954).
63. Parker, 442 U.S. at 73. For examples of the many opinions citing Parker
regarding the presumption, see Thomas v. Peters, 48 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring); United States v. Brown, 983 F.2d 201,202 (1 th Cir. 1993)
(deeming it "essential in this inquiryto applythe well-recognized presumption that ajury
follows its instructions").
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The Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task,
attend closely the particular language of the trial court's instructions
in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow
the instructions given them.... [W]e adhere to the crucial assumption
underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors
carefully follow instructions."
[T]he almost invariable assumption of the law [is] that jurors follow
their instructions . 6

C. The Nature of the Jury Instruction Presumption
The above quotations fail to make clear the precise nature of the
presumption. Is it rebuttable? Is it non-rebuttable? Or is it of an entirely
different nature-not a legal presumption at all but rather a fixed rule that serves
as a necessary foundation for the jury system?
1. A Fixed Rule or Non-Rebuttable Presumption
The above quote from Parkerhas been interpreted by some as the Court's
recognition of a fixed rule. Citing Parker, lower courts explain the jury
instruction presumption as:
not a bursting bubble,[66] applicable only in the absence of better
evidence. It is a rule of law-a description of the premises underlying
the jury system, rather than a proposition about jurors' abilities and
states of mind.67

64. Francis, 471 U.S. at 324 n.9. For examples of the many opinions citing
Francisregarding the presumption, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,740 (1993),
United States v. Acevedo, 141 F.3d 1421, 1426 (11 th Cir. 1998), and Wade v. Calderon,
29 F.3d 1312, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994).
65. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 200. For examples of the many opinions citing
Richardson regarding the presumption, see Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584
(1994) (finding "no reason to depart from 'the almost invariable assumption of the law
that jurors follow their instructions"') (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206); United
States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183,202 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739,
756 (1st Cir. 1999).
66. "Bursting bubble" is a reference to the Thayer theory of presumptions. See
supranote 40 and accompanying text. In this context it undoubtedly means that the jury
instruction presumption is a hard and fast rule of the system that is not subject to
refutation.
67. Thomas, 48 F.3d at 1009 (Easterbrook, J., concurring); see Gacy v. Welborn,
994 F.2d 305,313 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Rodriquez v. Colorado, 498 U.S. 1055, 1058
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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These courts, describing a fixed rule of procedure, necessarily see the rule as one
that governs in all cases.68 Other similarly-minded courts, terming this concept
a "presumption" rather than a "rule," nevertheless see it as non-rebuttable. The
result, of course, is the same. Claims, and indeed proof, that instructions are
particularly difficult to understand cannot be considered because of the shield of
the jury instruction presumption. 9 This approach is starkly visible in the
Seventh Circuit opinion in Gacy v. Welborn.7"
The infamous serial killer John Wayne Gacy was convicted and sentenced
to death by an Illinoisjury.7 In federal habeas corpus proceedings" challenging
his convictions, Gacy presented the results of an empirical study conducted by
Professor Hans Zeisel to determine whether the Illinois jury instructions
pertaining to the proper consideration of mitigation evidence in the penalty phase
of a capital trial" were adequately understood by a test group.74 The study

(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "[a]s a matter of convention, we
presume thatj urors followjuryinstructions"); United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002,
1005 (5th Cir. 1979) (claiming that "[t]o preserve that essential feature [of trial byjury],
the law trusts that a jury will understand and follow the law as instructed"). An
interesting twist on this view is contained in Nethery v. Collins where the Fifth Circuit
held that abandonment of the jury instruction presumption would be the equivalent of
establishing a new rule of criminal procedure which was not permitted in the context of
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Nethery v. Collins, 993 F.2d 1154, 1162 (5th
Cir. 1993) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989)). The court in Gacy v.
Welborn followed the same reasoning. See Gacy, 994 F.2d at 311.
68. See, e.g., Brown, 983 F.2d at 202 (deeming the presumption crucial, essential
and necessary).
69. See Tiersma, supra note 5, at 1088 (claiming that "[i]n practice, this
presumption [that jurors understand their instructions] is nearly impossible to rebut").
70. 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionariesand
Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1, 35-39
(critiquing Gacy).
71. Gacy, 994 F.2d at 306. Gacy killed at least thirty-three young men over a
period of six years. He buried them underneath his house and upon his arrest the police
recovered the skeletal remains of most of the victims. Id. For details about the crimes
of John Wayne Gacy, see generally David Lohr, Boy Killer: John Wayne Gacy, CRIME
MAGAZINE, at http://www.crimemagazine.com/boyldllergacy.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2004).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (delineating remedies in federal court for
prisoners in state custody).
73. The instructions at issue make a case for doubting the validity of the jury
instruction presumption:
"If, after your deliberations, you unanimously determine that there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence
on the Defendant, you should sign the verdict form directing a sentence of
death. If, after your deliberations, you are not unanimous in concluding that
there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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concluded that when mitigation instructions, nearly identical to those given in
Gacy's trial, were given to test groups, a significant percentage did not correctly
understand the law." When this claim was rejected by the district court,7" Gacy
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The
court denied Gacy's appeal" with curious reasoning. For the sake of argument,
the court accepted the statistical findings," but rejected the claim that they
demonstrated a violation of Gacy's rights."9 According to the court, without

sentence, you must sign the verdict form directing a sentence of
imprisonment."
Gacy, 994 F.2d at 307.
The jurors were meant to understand that any one of them could prevent the
imposition of a death sentence if he or she found even one sufficient mitigating factor.
See id. In other words, unanimity was not required for the imposition of a life sentence.
For a discussion of the rule that individual jurors may consider specific mitigating factors
even if other jurors reject them, see generally McCoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433,
439-44 (1990), and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1988). Gacy also alleged
that his trial judge misread the prescribed instructions. Gacy, 994 F.2d at 307.
74. Gacy, 994 F.2d at 309-10.
75. For one sample question Professor Zeisel concluded that between 16.3 and 33.7
percent of jurors were likely to misunderstand. For another question the finding was
between 26.9 and 46.1 percent. See id. at 309.
76. Id. at 308.
77. The mitigation evidence instructions in question were, ofcourse, given to juries
in the penalty phases of many other Illinois capital defendants. One of these defendants,
James P. Free, Jr., had earlier offered the same study in his defense. See United States
ex rel.Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705, 709 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd in part& rev'd in part,
12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993). The federal district court hearing Free's case was persuaded
by the study's results and vacated his death sentence. Id. at 732. That decision was
pending an appeal by the State of Illinois when Gacy, having been denied relief on other
claims by a different federal district court judge, filed a post-verdict motion asking for
a hearing on the evidence presented in the study. Gacy, 994 F.2d at 308. The district
court denied Gacy's request for a hearing. Id. In deciding Gacy's appeal, Seventh
Circuit Judges Easterbrook, Manion and Kanne chose not to await the outcome of Free's
appeal (being considered by another panel), but instead decided the merits of the claim
at that time. Id. at 309 (commenting that "[i]mplementation of Gacy's sentences has been
stayed by federal litigation since 1989 .... Both Gacy and the State of Illinois are

entitled to decision without indefinite delay"). For a description of the Zeisel study and
how it was received by both the Freeand Gacy courts, see generally Tiersma, supra note
70, at 24-44. The survey questions in their entirety and the statistical results are reported
in Appendices A and B to the district court opinion in Free. See Free,806 F. Supp. at
732-84. Professor Hans Zeisel, who designed the study, coauthored one of the earliest
studies on jury behavior. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
(1966).
78. Gacy, 994 F.2d at 310; cf Free, 12 F.3d at 705-06 (finding that the Zeisel study
contained "two fatal flaws").
79. Gacy, 994 F.2d at 31O. Specifically, Gacy argued that the instructions inhibited
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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proof that an alternative set of instructions was more comprehensible, there was
no reason to find a constitutional violation. 0 The court took the position that
even convincing proof that as many as twenty-five percent of jurors can be
expected to misunderstand instructions concerning imposition of a death
sentence may be ignored because improved comprehension may be
unachievable."' In essence, the court's response was that this is a complicated
area of law,"2 that laypersons may be unable to grasp unfamiliar concepts (at
least without repeated exposure), and that maybe this is the best we can do."
The rationale for the court's view was-the "jury instruction presumption."
Quoting Parker, Franklin and Richardson, the court underscored the
"presumption" and "fixed rule of law" that jurors understand and follow their
instructions.8 4
2. A Rebuttable Rule
Some courts have a different interpretation of the jury instruction
presumption and view it as rebuttable. These courts claim that they are required
to rely upon the presumption, but only absent proof to the contrary. 5 This view
raises a number of subsidiary issues.
First, courts often note that only admissible evidence may properly rebut the
presumption. 6 One example of evidence commonly considered admissible to
demonstrate juror confusion is the content of notes sent from the jury to the trial

the jurors' consideration of relevant mitigation evidence in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 307-10.
80. Id. at 311 (stating that "actual levels of comprehension must be compared with
achievable levels of comprehension, not with ideal levels").
81. Id. In the words of the court, "[flor as long as the United States has been a
nation, judges have been using legalese in instructing juries, with an inevitable adverse
effect on the jury's comprehension." Id. at 312.
82. For a discussion of the ways in which capital case penalty phase instructions
are particularly complex, see infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
83. See Gacy, 994 F.2d at 311-12.
84. Id. at 313.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, No. 94-00080, 1996 WL 690155, at *4 (6th
Cir. Nov. 27, 1996) (utilizing jury instruction presumption "[b]ecause appellant proffers
no evidence that the jury behaved to the contrary"); United States v. Shukitis, 877 F.2d
1322, 1329 (7th Cir. 1989) (deciding that "[b]ecause the defendant has presented no
evidence to convince us otherwise, '[w]e make the crucial and valid assumption that
jurors carefully follow instructions given them by the court') (quoting United States v.
Stem, 858 F.2d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original).
86. See, e.g., Erikson v. Rowland, No. 92-55371, 1993 WL 128865, at *4 (9th Cir.
Apr. 26, 1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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judge during deliberations." A litigant may claim, for instance, that the jury's
inability to understand and consequently follow the given instructions is
demonstrated by one or more notes expressing confusion.
Lack of
comprehension is proven, it is argued, by either a plain statement such as, "we
don't understand part X of your instructions,"8 or by a question that, by its
content, shows lack of comprehension.89 An example of inadmissible but
relevant evidence here is juror testimony concerning the content of
deliberations.9 The Federal Rules of Evidence and most state evidentiary rules
bar jurors from offering testimony to impeach their verdict. Accordingly, such
evidence would not be a proper rebuttal to the presumption.9 '
Another issue, easily resolved, is which party has the burden of proving that
the jury misunderstood or failed to follow the instructions. The seemingly

87. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 228-29, 234-36 (2000) (denying
the defendant's claim but considering the jury's note as evidence of alleged confusion);
McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833,835-37 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the presumption
in the face of jury's note expressing confusion). For an extensive discussion of Weeks,
see infra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 70 A. 850, 850-51 (Pa. 1908) (finding the
charge inadequate because, after expressing confusion, jury was denied additional
instructions).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Barragan-Devis, 133 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing that it was "clear through juror correspondence that
the jury is erecting an erroneous mandatory presumption"); McDowell, 130 F.3d at 837
(stating that "[t]he plain language of the jury's request for guidance demonstrates that
eleven jurors were confused about the law").
90. For instance, after a verdict a party might seek to proffer testimony from one
or more of the jurors that allegedly demonstrates that instructions were either
misunderstood or even deliberately not followed. See, e.g., United States v. Venske, 296
F.3d 1284, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2002).
91. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides in part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind
or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection
therewith.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b); see, e.g., Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n Non-Stock v. Strand, 382
F.2d 224, 230 (8th Cir. 1967) (rejecting juror's affidavit concerning improper
considerations of deliberating jurors stating "[i]t is a well-established rule in the federal
courts and the Nebraska court that ajury verdict may not be impeached as to occurrences
in the jury room which inhere in the verdict"). State codes usually contain similar
restrictions. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 606(b); PA. R. EvID. 606(b). For a discussion of the
breadth of this rule and its repercussions, see generally Tiersma, supranote 5, at 1087-88
(pointing out that evidence that a particular jury was actually confused about the law has
little impact because it is inadmissible).
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obvious answer is that the party (usually the criminal defendant) who argues that
the presumption should be rejected in a particular case has the burden to
92
rebut it.
The standard ofproof is yet another issue. Arguably, the standard is the one
announced by the Supreme Court in Boyde v. California.93 In Boyde, the Court
held that the standard of review for a challenged jury instruction is whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied an instruction in a way that
prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.94 Boyde,
however, did not involve a claim that a key instruction was too difficult to
understand. Rather, the allegation in Boyde, a capital case,9" was that certain
instructions concerning the proper consideration of mitigating evidence during
the penalty phase were ambiguous and, therefore, susceptible to erroneous

92. See United States v. Shukitis, 877 F.2d 1322, 1329 (7th Cir. 1989); Smith, 70
A. at 850 (holding that the burden is upon the party who alleges inadequate instructions).
93. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
94. Id. at 380. The Court elaborated by explaining that the defendant need not
prove that it was more likely than not that the instruction improperly inhibited the
consideration of relevant evidence, but on the other hand, a mere possibility of
misapplication of the law was insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Id.
95. An intriguing question is whether Boyde and its standard apply to non-capital
cases as well. Boyde argued that an ambiguous jury instruction violated his Eighth
Amendment right to have the jury in the penalty phase consider and give effect to all
relevant mitigating evidence. Id. at 377-78. The Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment
is only violated when there is a reasonable likelihood that the challenged instructions
prevented the jury from considering "constitutionallyrelevant" evidence. Id.at 380. The
Eighth Amendment has never been found to require the consideration of any particular
form of evidence outside of the capital case setting. This at least partly explains why in
Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993), the Court's majority suggested that Boyde did
not apply in a non-capital case saying "in a noncapital case such as this there is no
counterpart to the Eighth Amendment's doctrine of'constitutionallyrelevant evidence."'
Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 342. However, concurring in Gilmore, Justice O'Connor reacted
to this statement by countering that "Boyde did not purport to limit application of that
[reasonable likelihood] standard to capital cases, nor have we so limited it." Id. at 348
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (pointing out that the Court had already applied Boyde to a
non-capital case in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). Moreover, as Justice
O'Connor's concurrence emphasizes, erroneous or ambiguous jury instructions may
inhibit the consideration of evidence in violation of other constitutional amendments. Id.
at 348-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987)
(the defendant's right to testify on his or her own behalf); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986) (the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause right to an
opportunity for effective cross-examination)). A tougher question would be raised,
perhaps, when a defendant claims that a confusing or incomprehensible instruction
violates his rights under state, rather than federal law. Nevertheless, in all cases, ajury's
inability to understand and thus apply the law, when sufficiently significant, cuts off the
essence of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8

16

Ritter: Ritter: Your Lips Are Moving...but the Words Aren't Clear:

2004]

JURYINSTRUCTION PRESUMPTION

interpretation.96 In cases like Boyde, a particular instruction lends itself to at
least two plausible interpretations, one of which is an erroneous statement of
law.97 The appellate court is then asked to vacate the conviction because of the
risk that the jury adopted the wrong interpretation.9
In these cases, a
presumption that jurors understand instructions does not apply because it begs
the question. An ambiguous instruction, by definition, may be rationally
understood in more than one way. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Boyde Court
made no mention of the jury instruction presumption. When it announced the
standard of proof for ambiguous instruction challenges, 99 the Boyde Court,
therefore, did not indicate whether that standard of proof should apply to efforts
to rebut the jury instruction presumption. Ten years after Boyde, however, these
apples and oranges seemingly came together in Weeks v. Angelone.' °
Lonnie Weeks, Jr. was convicted in a Virginia state court of fatally shooting
a state trooper.'0 ' The state sought the death penalty.'0 2 Several hours into
deliberation, the jurors sent a note to the court asking whether they were

96. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378-80. Specifically, the penalty phase instructions listed
eleven possible mitigating factors that the jury could find, including what is usually
considered a catch-all factor, designed to allow the jury to consider a broad range of
factors related to the defendant's character, background, mental health, etc. Boyde
argued that the wording of the factors, including the catch-all factor, was ambiguous and
could be interpreted to unconstitutionally limit the breadth of evidence the jury would
believe it could consider. Id. at 377-78. Applying its newly announced standard, the
Court denied Boyde relief. Id. at 386. The distinction between Boyde and confusing
instruction cases may not be terribly significant, however. In claims of both confusing
and ambiguous instructions the essence of the problem is that there is a risk that the law
will be misunderstood and thus incorrectly applied to the facts.
97. Id. at 380. The Supreme Court decided a similar issue in Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367 (1988). In Mills, the Court considered two possible interpretations of a key
part of the jury instructions given during the penalty phase of Mills' capital trial. Id. at
377-78. The Court ruled in Mills' favor because it was not satisfied that the jury did not
embrace the erroneous interpretation. Id. at 381, 384. Earlier, in Francisv. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985), the Court also took up the question of the likelihood that the jury
properly interpreted an ambiguous instruction. Id. at 315-16.
98. See, e.g., Mills, 486 U.S. at 375-76.
99. The Boyde Court acknowledges that it has, in the past, considered claims that
ambiguous jury instructions caused a constitutional violation and that the standards the
Court employed to resolve these claims were not uniform. See Boyde, 494 U.S. at 37880. For instance, in Mills v. Maryland,the Court at various points in its opinion made
reference to three different standards. See Mills, 486 U.S. at 374-76, 377. The Boyde
Court, therefore, thought it important to eliminate any confusion and announce a clear
standard. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 379-80.
100. 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
101. Id. at 227-28.
102. Id. at 228-31.
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obligated to return a death sentence if they found that the prosecutor had
established certain facts or whether they were still permitted to impose a life
sentence.'0 3 Rather than providing a direct answer to this question (e.g., "You
may impose a death sentence, but, upon a finding of mitigation, are not obligated
to do so."), the court referred the jury to the portion of the previously given
instructions that the court believed addressed this issue.0 4 At the completion of
the penalty phase the jury imposed a death sentence.'
In a federal habeas corpus petition, Weeks alleged that his rights were
violated when the trial court refused to adequately respond to the jury's
expression of confusion regarding its instructions. 0 6 Weeks' position was that
the court should have provided a clear answer, consistent with the law, that "yes,
the jury could return a life sentence even if an aggravating factor had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' 17 While the United States Supreme Court
never suggested that Weeks' proposed answer would have been an incorrect
statement of law, the Court decided that the response of the trial court, simply
telling the jury to reread a portion of the previously given instructions, was
acceptable.'
An important part of the Court's rationale was-the jury instruction
presumption.0 9 Like "nonsense upon stilts,"" 0 the Court added the additional

103. Id. at 228-29. The instruction causing confusion was one that gave the jurors
two alternative aggravating factors upon which thejury could, ifunanimously convinced
of their existence beyond a reasonable doubt, base a sentence of death. Id. at 229. One
alternative involved the defendant's future dangerousness while the other involved the
manner in which the murder was carried out. Id. The jury was instructed that if it found
either of the alternatives, it may return a sentence of death. Id. The word "may" rather
than "must" was used because under Virginia law the jury could impose a life sentence,
despite adequate proof of one or both alternatives, if it found mitigating circumstances.
Id. at 232. The jury asked:
"If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the alternatives,
then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? Or must we decide
(even though he is guilty of one of the alternatives) whether or not to issue the
death penalty, or one of the life sentences? What is the Rule? Please
clarify?"
Id. at 229. The jurors' question demonstrated that they were confused about their
obligation if one or more of the alternatives was proven.
104. Id. The court told the jury, "'See second paragraph of Instruction # 2
(Beginning with "If you find from....").' Id.
105. Id. at 230-31.
106. Id. at 227.
107. Id. at 230.
108. Id. at 234.
109. Id. (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). Just before his
discussion of the presumption, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
explained that Buchananv. Angelone, a 1998 Supreme Court decision, provided support
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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presumption that a jury understands the court's answer to its question. I"' This
presumption's application in Weeks meant that even though the jurors told the
court that they did not understand the instruction, they were presumed to
understand it after the same instruction was merely reread to them." 2
It is of particular interest that the Weeks Court appeared to view the
presumptions (regarding juror understanding of instructions and answers to
questions) as rebuttable. This is implicit in the Court's amplification of what it
termed "empirical support" for the presumption." 3 Presumably, a premise that
is not rebuttable needs no support in order to rule the day in a given case.' ' In
Weeks, however, the Court chose to bow to the presumption because of
corroborating circumstances such as the fact that additional clarification was
provided in defense counsel's summation," 5 the lack of additional questions and

for the result in Weeks. Id. at 231-32. Buchanan, like Weeks, involved a review of
Virginia's penalty phase jury instructions. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269
(1998). The majority on the Buchanan Court found that the instructions that allegedly
confused Weeks' jury were proper. Id. at 279. In fact Buchanan's jury was not given
any instructions on the meaning of mitigating evidence or the way it may be considered
by a capital jury. Id. at 273-74. Chief Justice Rehnquist, also writing for the majority in
Buchanan, stated plainly that "[t]he absence of an instruction on the concept of
mitigation and of instructions on particular statutorily defined mitigating factors did not
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 279. In Weeks, Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that Weeks' jury was given even more guidance than Buchanan's
jury on the relevance of mitigation evidence. See Weeks, 528 U.S. at 231-32. Of course,
the different issue raised in Weeks was the proper response to a jury's expression of
confusion.
110. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 480 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing JEREMY BENTHAM, AnarchicalFallacies,in 2 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 501
(1843)).
111. See Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234 (citing Armstrong v. Toler, 24 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
258 (1826)).
112. The absurdity of the majority's logic was hardly lost on the dissenters who
responded, "if the jurors found it necessary to ask the judge what that paragraph meant
in the first place, why should we presume that they would find it any less ambiguous just
because the judge told them to read it again?" Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 234-35.
114. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
115. Cf United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding
that "'arguments of counsel [cannot] substitute for instructions by the court') (quoting
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1978)); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch,
Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis ofInstructional Comprehension and
Penalty PhaseClosingArguments, 21 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 575, 589-92 (1997). Haney
and Lynchconclude after their studythat attorneys' penaltyphase closing arguments have
not enhancedjurors' comprehension of legal instructions. Id. These researchers attribute
this failure to the role of attorneys as biased advocates and to the fact that "attorneys are
no more effective than judges in explaining the key concepts of aggravation, mitigation,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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the two-hour-long deliberations after the court's direction to reread the given
instruction.' 16 Had these circumstances been otherwise, one could reasonably
speculate that the Court would have been hard pressed to blindly employ the
presumption." 7 In sum, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Weeks identifies
a presumption that jurors understand (and follow) instructions, a presumption
that jurors understand the court's responses (whatever they might be) to their
questions regarding the instructions, and the possibility that these presumptions
can be rebutted." 8
Regarding the burden of proof, the Weeks Court utilized the Boyde
standard." 9 In the end, Lonnie Weeks, Jr. was denied relief because, in the eyes
of the majority, he could not establish a reasonable likelihood that his jury's
confusion prevented it from properly considering the evidence. 20

and extenuation in terms that are comprehensible to lay people." Id. at 589.
116. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234-35. The Court seems to hold the jury's behavior
under a microscope. The Court infers from thejury's silence that it was satisfied by the
judge's response to its question. Id. According to the Court, this inference is bolstered
by the observations that the trial court displayed "[t]he utmost willingness ... to gratify
them" and that "[t]his particular jury demonstrated that it was not too shy to ask
questions." Id. at 234, 235-36.
117. Arguably, there is an alternative interpretation of the Court's reference to
empirical support for the presumption. It could be said that the Court felt compelled by
the presumption to reject Weeks' claim but pointed to the empirical support merely to
illustrate that the presumption is valid and the result fair and reliable. The Court's
finding that Weeks failed to persuade them to reject the presumption, however,
undermines this alternative interpretation. The dissenting opinion states even more
clearly that the presumption is one that may be rebutted. See id. at 244 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
118. My conclusion that the Weeks Court viewed the jury instruction presumption
as rebuttable is bolstered bythe Court's later decision in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782,
808 (2001). In Penry, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion more than implies that the
jury instruction presumption is rebuttable. See id. at 788. Penry's death sentence was
set aside by the Court for a second time (for the Court's opinion setting aside Penry's
first death sentence, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)) because a portion
of the penalty phase jury instructions was deemed too confusing. See Penry, 532 U.S.
at 799. Beginning her analysis by stating "We generally presume thatjurors follow their
instructions," Justice O'Connor relied upon the context and circumstances and, citing
Boyde, concluded that there was at least a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied
the instruction. Id. at 799-800.
119. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 236.
120. See id. The dissentingjustices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter), while
disagreeing with the outcome, agreed that the reasonable probability standard was
appropriate. Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a persuasive critique of Weeks, see
Stephen P. Garvey et al., CorrectingDeadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries
in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 627 (2000). Professors Garvey, Johnson and
Marcus designed and administered a studyto determine whether the Weeks jury probably
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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Whether they consider it rebuttable or firm, our courts find it necessary to
adhere to the presumption that jurors understand instructions. The next Part
considers whether the presumption has legs.

Ill. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE JURY
INSTRUCTION PRESUMPTION
Perhaps a preliminary inquiry ought to be whether and to what degree the
presumption requires justification. Should it not be acceptable or even desirable
for our judicial system to simply proceed under the assumption that English
speaking jurors understand the English words comprising the trial court's
instructions?.. The answer is, "no.' ' 22 Ajury instruction presumption, whether
or not it is rebuttable, needs an adequate foundation. If a question as important
as whether juries understand their instructions is to be answered by simply
asserting that they do, the judiciary should have very good reasons for doing so.
Let us consider a couple of examples. One commonly used instruction
allows a jury to presume that one found to be in the recent and exclusive
possession of stolen goods did steal those goods.'23 A jury receiving this
instruction, if persuaded to do so by the prosecution,' 24 may presume that a
defendant found in exclusive possession of recently stolen goods is the thief.
While we know that one who is not the thief may, for a variety of reasons, have
possession of recently stolen items, courts sanction the use of this presumption

did or did not understand the law and whether a clarifying response to the jurors'
question would have improved comprehension. Id. at 633-35. The results of the study
suggest that the key instruction was most likely misunderstood, that referring the jury
back to the same instruction did nothing to improve comprehension and that the response
proposed by the defense, if given to the jury, would have dramatically increased
comprehension. Id. at 638-40; see also Anderson, supranote 58, at 770-76 (arguing that
"[t]he problems that are evidenced in the Supreme Court's Weeks opinion make clear that
the Court has not provided adequate supervision to capital juries").
121. Or do jurors sometimes experience the kind of frustration felt by Alice at the
Mad Hatter's tea party when "[t]he Hatter's remark seemed to her to have no sort of
meaning in it, and yet it was certainly English"? See LEWIS CARROLL,Alice "sAdventures
in Wonderland, in LOGIcAL NONSENSE: THE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 79, 112 (Philip

C. Blackburn & Lionel White eds., 1934).
122. Bethany K. Dumas, English professor and linguist, likewise rejects such a
notion. She mocks ChiefJustice Rehnquist's reliance on thejury instruction presumption
by declaring, "Apparently, in [Rehnquist's] view, mere exposure to language guarantees
comprehension!" See Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury
Instructions,and Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 702 (2000).
123. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 361 (West 2002).
124. As explained supra note 40 and accompanying text, despite the presumption,
the burden of persuasion remains on the prosecution. Therefore the jury may accept the
presumed fact as true only if persuaded to do so by the prosecuting attorney. See id.
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because logic and experience teach us that often'25 those possessing things
recently' 26 stolen in fact are the ones who stole them. Thus, there is a rational
connection between the proven fact (recent exclusive possession) and the
presumed fact (larceny). Now consider another, admittedly extreme, example.
Suppose a legislature added to the criminal code the presumption that redheads
found in (not necessarily recent or exclusive) possession of stolen goods could
be presumed to have stolen those goods. There is no rational connection
between being a redhead possessing stolen goods and being responsible for the
theft. Likewise there is no historical basis, no legal precedent and no empirical
evidence to connect the two facts. While it is exceedingly unlikely that a jury
would be persuaded to follow such a presumption, it is exceedingly unfair, and
in fact unconstitutional,' to allow even the possibility that the presumption
could substitute for better proof. This presumption would not be allowed to
stand. It is no less unfair for the jury instruction presumption to govern without
a sensible foundation for its use.
The following sections explore where, if anywhere, lie the bases for the jury
instruction presumption. For this we look at legal precedent, history, rationality
and logic, empirical data and experience, and policy and practicalities.
A. Legal Precedentand the Reference to Justice Traynor
When courts rely upon the presumption they do so without any genuine
authority.'28 The following passage from Connecticutv. Johnson'29 is typical of
how courts articulate what they perceive to be the precedent for the presumption:
Chief Justice Traynor notes in his monograph on harmless error: "In
the absence of definitive studies to the contrary, we must assume that
juries for the most part understand and faithfully follow instructions.
The concept of a fair trial encompasses a decision by a tribunal that

125. The rational connection standard, at a minimum, requires the connection exist
more often than not. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969); infra notes 17677 and accompanying text.
126. If not statutorily defined, typically case law provides interpretations for terms
like "recent" and "exclusive." See, e.g., State v. Sapiel, 432 A.2d 1262, 1268-69 (Me.
198 1)(finding one week and nine weeks after theft to satisfy requirement that possession
be recent); State v. Mower, 407 A.2d 729, 732 (Me. 1979) (holding that exclusive
possession may be had jointly with others).
127. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
128. Accord JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY INAMERICAN

JUSTICE 117 (1949) (writing that "[u]nder our system, however, the courts are obligated
to make the unrealistic assumption that the often incomprehensible words, uttered in the
physical presence of the jurors, have some real effect on their thought processes").
129. 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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has understood
and applied the law to all material issues in the
130
,

case."

Justice Traynor... did indeed suggest that we work under the assumption
that jurors understand and follow instructions. 32 However, the only authority
Justice Traynor offered was a work by Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel entitled
The American Jury. 33 While The American Jury reports the authors' findings
on jury decision-making,134 it cannot support the assertion that jurors understand
instructions. Part of the authors' findings confirms that, in their determination
of factual issues, jurors usually get it right.' a5 However, the study is silent on
juror comprehension of legal instructions. Ironically, the late Professor Zeisel
authored a subsequent study, exclusively concerned with juror comprehension
of instructions, that led him to conclude thatjurors did not adequately understand
Illinois pattern jury instructions for the penalty phase of a capital case.' 36 In any

130. Id. at 87 n. 14 (citing ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR
73-74 (1970)). Traynor's monograph and cases citing to it are routinely offered as
authority for the presumption. See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 (1985);
Bush v. Stephenson, 669 F. Supp. 1322,1340 n. 17 (E.D.N.C. 1986), af'd,826 F.2d 1059
(4th Cir. 1987).
131. Roger J. Traynor was a Justice of the California Supreme Court from 1940 to
1964 and Chief Justice from 1964 to 1970. See G. Edward White, Tribute to Roger
Traynor, 69 VA. L. REv. 1381, 1382-83 (1983); see also Died. Roger J Traynor, TIME,
May 30, 1983, at 88. For a discussion of Traynor's reputation, see generally John W.
Poulos, The JudicialPhilosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1643, 1643-45

(1995); John W. Poulos, The Judicial Process and Substantive Criminal Law: The
Legacy ofRoger Traynor, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 429,429-31 (1996). Traynor authored
approximately 259 opinions in criminal cases. His apparent focus was on the judicial
process rather than substantive issues in criminal law. Poulos, The JudicialProcess,
supra, at 434.
132. See TRAYNOR, supranote 130, at 73-74.
133. See id. at 105 n.210 (citing KALVEN&ZEISEL, supra note 77, at 55-65, 22197, and claiming that "this assumption is supported by the findings [in The American
Jury]").
134. See KAIVEN & ZEISEL, supranote 77, at 55-65, 221-97. Professors Kalven
and Zeisel studied the efficacy of the jury system by comparing judge and jury decisionmaking on the same body of evidence. Id. at 10-11. In other words, they sent
questionnaires to trial judges asking for jury verdicts of cases tried before them and
asking how they (the judges) would have decided the case. Id. at 45-54. The authors
then looked for instances of judge/jury disagreement and tried to offer explanations for
such disagreement. See id. at 55-81, 104-17.
135. Id. at 149-62, 494.
136. See Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1993); Gacy v. Wellborn, 994
F.2d 305, 305 (7th Cir. 1993). In Gacy and Free the Seventh Circuit rejected Zeisel's
findings noting flaws in his methodology. See Free, 12 F.3d at 705-06; Gacy, 994 F.2d
at 311.
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event, TheAmerican Jury study, contrary to Justice Traynor's reference, does not
prove that jurors understand instructions.'
Moreover, without question Justice Traynor did not intend his words to be
a shield, protecting incomprehensible instructions from judicial scrutiny. The
oft-cited Traynor piece was a monograph on the subject ofharmless error. When
he argued that we must assume that juries for the most part understand and
faithfully follow instructions, Justice Traynor was simply making the point that
erroneous jury instructions should not be deemed harmless simply because their
legalistic language suggests that they may not have been understood. 38 Traynor
chose the assumption that jurors understand and follow instructions over the
other extreme: the assumption that jurors can never understand even simple and
clear legal instructions. 39 Nevertheless, Justice Traynor appeared to have been
quite concerned that a reviewing court be assured that this assumption holds true
in any given trial. He said, "[T]he concept of a fair trial encompasses a decision
by a tribunal that has understood and applied the law to all material issues in the
case."'" Quite significantly, Traynor went on to say, "The most troublesome
instructions are not those that are demonstrably incorrect but those that may be
incorrectly understood because of their inept language. If an instruction on a
substantial issue is confusing to a reasonable juror, the judgment should be
reversed."''
Aside from earlier courts' reliance on the presumption, 42 Justice Traynor's
remarks are the only authority referenced when the jury instruction presumption

137. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Jury Reform at the End of the Century: Real
Agreement, Real Changes, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 213, 215 (1999) (pointing out that
Zeisel's research published in The American Jury established that jurors are competent
fact finders and "study after study [has] found that jurors are far less competent at
understanding the law as presented to them in the judges' instructions").
138. See TRAYNOR, supra note 130, at 73. Justice Traynor recommended that
when a jury instruction error relates to a substantial element of an appellant's case the
appellate court should avoid finding it highly probable that the instruction had no
influence on the verdict. Id. at 74. The opposite would be true if the instruction involved
an issue not material to the case. Id.
139. Id. at 73. Justice Traynor acknowledged and rejected a middle ground, that
it is impossible to know whether or not a jury managed to comprehend a set of
instructions. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 74.
142. This kind of empty precedent was mocked by Felix Cohen when he criticized
the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 818-20 (1935). He
complained that "[iun practice, the Supreme Court professes to consider, in a 'due
process' case, primarily its own former adjudications on the subject, apparently believing
with the Bellman, that what it says three times must be true." Id. at 820.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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is called into service. Contrary to the references, however, neither Justice
Traynor's writings nor his sources support such a presumption.
B. History
An examination of the history and development of Anglo-American trial by
jury 43 fails to uncover any experience that could explain the emergence of a
presumption that jurors understand legalistic instructions. Nor does history
reveal any commonly held belief that they would.
Patternjury instructions (printed materials suggested for use by trial courts
in a given jurisdiction that contain judicial charges on principles and elements
of law) became widely available in the latter part of the twentieth century.'" Up
until that point, the dilenma of how or whether to teach law to jurors was tackled
in a variety of ways ranging from no instructions, 45 to open courtroom
dialogue, 46 to judges dictating a verdict. 47 Colonial 4 and early American
practices concerning the jury's role vis-a-vis the law present interesting
courtroom scenarios. Nevertheless, they far from suggest that early jurists had

143. Surprisingly there is relatively little historical study of the jury trial in
America, much less jury instructions. See Harold M. Hyman & Catherine M. Tarrant,
Aspects ofAmerican Trial JuryHistory, in THE JURY SYSTEM INAMERICA: A CRITICAL
OVERVIEW 23, 24 (Rita James Simon ed., 1975) (lamenting the "very thin body of
American legal history concerning juries"); Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and
ConstitutionalContexts ofJury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 421 (1996) (noting
that the historical development of the American jury has been less studied than that of
the English jury). Regarding trial byjury in colonial America, historian John M. Murrin
discovered that seventeenth century New England was the "region best served by
published court records and scholarly monographs." See John M. Murrin, Magistrates,
Sinners, and a PrecariousLiberty: Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-CenturyNew England,
in SAINTS & REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAYS ON EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 152, 154 (David
D. Hall et al. eds., 1984).
144. See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY INAMERICA 71 (1988); NIELAND, supra note
57, at 4-7.
145. See BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS 74 (1987); Smith, supra
note 143, at 441.
146. See THoMAs ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 278

(1985); Smith, supra note 143, at 409.

147. See J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS INENGLAND 1660-1800, at 408
(1986); ROBERT L. MCBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY 4-8 (1969).
148. The circumstances under which one would have a right to a trial byjury were

far from uniform in the colonies. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
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evidence that lay 4 9 jurors were capable of understanding the language of the
law.

1. Colonial and Early American Juries: No Instructions
It is useful to divide the history of American juries and their responsibility
for issues of law into three overlapping periods. The first covers an era from the
seventeenth century through much of the nineteenth century, when jurors took
it upon themselves or in some settings were even encouraged to determine
questions of law as well as questions of fact.' 0 During this period,' there was
a commonly held belief that jurors already knew the law as well as anyone else.
In fact, quite often trial judges were laymen, no better trained in law than an
average citizen called to serve on a jury.152 Either way, jurors felt free to

149. Apparently, at least in certain early English cases, special jurors were selected
because of their social class or because they had particular expertise. See Smith, supra
note 143, at 402. The expertise, be it land ownership or merchants' affairs, was thought
to make these jurors more suitable as fact finders in related cases. Id.
150. Used here, questions of "law" means questions of pure law as opposed to
mixed questions of law and fact. An example of a question of pure law is whether an
alleged accomplice to a crime must be proven to have had the same criminal intent as the
principal. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06, 1OA U.L.A. 110-11 (2001)
(enumerating the legal requirements for criminal complicity). A related example of a
mixed question would be whether the circumstantial evidence of an accused accomplice's
mental state proved that she had the required criminal intent. For further explanation of
the difference between questions of pure law and mixed questions, see generally
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (applying the concepts of pure and mixed
questions to analysis of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
.151. The right of juries to decide questions of law died out in civil cases well
before it did in criminal cases. See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of
Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY I11, 116 (1998). Interestingly, this right or practice was not one that the
colonists borrowed from England. See Smith, supra note 143, at 446-47. While the
concept that juries decided law began to fall into disfavor by the mid-nineteenth century,
see, e.g., United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No.
14,545); see generally Smith, supra note 143, at 446-53 (describing how the powers of
the jury began to be questioned during the 1800s), the United States Supreme Court
concluded definitively that courts rather than juries determine questions of law in both
civil and criminal cases in Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895). Justice
Harlan's opinion in Sparfprovides an exhaustive account of how the province ofthejury
was viewed by English courts, lower federal courts, state courts and legal scholars. See
id. at 64-99; cf Krauss, supra, at 121-22 (arguing that colonial juries never actually had
the "right" to decide the law, that they may not have done so to the extent many historians
believe and that present day supporters of jury nullification should, perhaps, be unable
to rely on the colonial jury system for authority).
152. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF TRIAL BY
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construe and determine the law for themselves, especially in criminal cases." 3
They were free to interpret the law on their own or even impose rules of law of
their own creation. For obvious reasons these juries virtually never received
instruction on the law. 1 4 Had the lack of instruction been due to a perception
that laypersons were able to intuit and apply complex legal principles without the
benefit of comprehensive instructions, this period might offer some historical
support for the jury instruction presumption.'
To the contrary, however,
historians agree that jurors were not told the law because they found the law.

JURY 73 (1999); Eaton, The Development of the JudicialSystem in Rhode Island, 14
YALE L.J. 148, 153 n.* (1905); Smith, supra note 143, at 449-50.
153. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETrS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 26-30 (1975);
Smith, supra note 143, at 446; cf. Hyman & Tarrant, supranote 143, at 35 (commenting
that moderates and conservatives disagreed about whether juries should find facts alone
or both facts and law); Krauss, supra note 15 1, at 114 (claiming that the perception that
jurors had or have the "right" to decide the law is incorrect and that the nature and rules
of our jury system do, however, give juries the "power" to decide law); Edson R.
Sunderland, Verdicts, GeneralandSpecial,29 YALEL.J. 253,253-58 (1920) (discussing
the debate regarding authority for juries to decide questions of law). Accord JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 90-95
(1994) (discussing the fact/law distinction and its impact on jury nullification); FRANK,
supra note 128, at 113.
154. See MANN, supra note 145, at 74; Smith, supranote 143, at 441 (stating that
in colonial Massachusetts jury instructions were either not given or were not very
elaborate); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 153, at 9. While most historians report that
most often colonial juries were given no instructions at all, see supra note 145 and
accompanying text, Abramson reports that advisory as opposed to mandatory instructions
were offered. "[Colonial] juries were crucially instructed that they had the right to decide
questions of law as well as of fact.... Juries could disobey... instructions, construe the
law independently, or even set aside the law entirely to render verdicts according to
conscience." ABRAMSON, supra note 153, at 9; see also FRANK, supra note 128, at 112
(explaining that "during the latter part of the 18th century and the early part of the 19th,
judges told juries, especially in criminal cases, that it was for thejury to decide not only
the facts but also the 'law' . . . and that the jury was not bound to accept the judges's
instructions concerning the rules"); LEVY, supranote 152, at 69.
155. There is some evidence that the jury's power to determine the law was rooted
in the notion that ordinary citizens were, from an early age, well versed in basic
"regulations of society." See, e.g., Smith, supra note 143, at 449-50 (citing Adams'
Diary Notes on the Right of Juries (Feb. 12, 1771), in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
228, 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
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2. Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: Juries Receive
the Law in Various Forms
While the notion that jurors determined law continued in one form or
another until the end of the nineteenth century, it began to fall into disfavor long
before then. 56 Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, jury instructions on
law, such as they were, could be heard in American courtrooms.' 57
Significantly, the format of the earliest instructions suggests a concern that
truly legalistic instructions would be pointless. The first indications of judicial
instructions to jurors might better be termed judicial recommendations." 8 Much
of the exchange could be described as judicial marshaling of the evidence. Trial
courts would sum up the testimony and frequently express personal opinions
regarding witnesses' credibility.' 59 It was not customary for courts to offer
instruction on principles of law to enable jurors to then independently apply such
law to facts they found during their deliberations.
Several other characteristics of the earliestjury instructions likewise provide
no foundation for the instruction presumption. In England, informal dialogue

156. See FRANK, supranote 128, at 112; Smith, supra note 143, at 442-45; see also

supranote 151 and accompanying text.
157. Naturally, as the concept thatjurors could decide the law came into increasing
disfavor, the need to instruct the jury on the law grew. Indescribing the evolution of the
jury's role in Connecticut, Bruce H. Mann reveals examples of trials in which the jury,
even at a time when it had more power to decide law, referred questions of law back to
the bench. See MANN, supra note 145, at 79.
158. This practice had strong roots in England. See BEATTIE, supra note 147, at

408; GREEN, supra note 146, at 273. At times these "recommendations" were
aggressively urged upon the jury. In fact historians recount true horror stories ofjudicial
coercion of jurors. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 146, at 200-64. The best known and

perhaps most horrifying of these is the tale of Edward Bushnell. He and his fellowjurors
endured increasingly tortuous conditions imposed by the trial court for their refusal to
convict William Penn of conspiracy to disturb the peace and preach Quakerism. See
GODFREY D. LEHMAN, WE THE JURY...

: THE IMPACT OF JURORS ON OUR BASIC

FREEDOMS 35-62 (1997) (detailing the Penn trial wherein jurors were deprived of food,
drink, sleep and even chamber pots in an effort to coerce guilty verdicts); see also Smith
v. Times Publ'g Co., 36 A. 296 (Pa. 1897); VALERIE P. HANS & NEEL VIDMAR, JUDGING

THE JURY 21-22 (1986). In eighteenth century America, rather than actual coercion, it
was more common to find that trial judges identified the relevant issues and commented
on the evidence. See Smith, supra note 143, at 441-43.
159. See Smith, supranote 143, at 44 1. But see Eaton,supra note 152, at 153 n.*

(quoting 1833 jury charge in which judge stated that his policy was "never to sum up the
facts in the case, but merely to explain the law").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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inside the courtroom between judge and jury was not unusual. 60 Thus, any
instructions jurors found confusing could be clarified through discussion.
Further evidence of skepticism regarding jurors' ability to understand
instructions on the law was the use of "special verdicts."' 6' When asked to
deliver a special verdict, juries deliberate over specific factual disputes, leaving
it for the court to decide the legal significance of their fact-finding. 62 Special
verdicts were, and remain, controversial. 63 They are criticized as a means for
the bench to assert control overjuries.' The ability to return a general verdict,
i.e., guilty/not guilty or liable/not liable, is seen by some commentators as
necessary for a jury to maintain independence. 65 Nevertheless, the popularity
of special verdicts increased in the eighteenth century, at least partly because of
a concern shared by both judges and juries that juries were ill-equipped to apply
law.'" Apparently, the problem of jurors being asked to apply that with which
they lacked familiarity was not deemed solvable through the provision of oral
instructions.
Thus, the early English and American trial systems offer no experiences, let
alone proof, that jurors would comprehend and correctly apply legalistic
instructions. In fact, jury instruction practices pre-dating modem day pattern

160. See BEATTIE, supra note 147, at 408-09; GREEN, supra note 146, at 278;
Smith, supra note 143, at 409 ("The interaction between the judge and jury during this
period might have been as informal as to be described as 'plain chatter."').
161. See LEVY, supra note 152, at 71; MANN, supranote 145, at 79; Smith, supra
note 143, at 486-88. The use of special verdicts in civil trials continues even now,
authorized by Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49; HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 158, at 39.

163. See Smith, supra note 143, at 487-88. See generallyKate H. Nepveu, Beyond
"Guilty "or "Not Guilty ": Giving Special Verdicts in CriminalJury Trials, 21 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 263 (2003) (describing current use of special verdicts and recommending
rethinking and broadening their application); Sunderland, supra note 153, at 261-67
(outlining the objections to the use of special verdicts and proposing solutions).
164. See, e.g., LEHMAN, supra note 158, at 16. But see FRANK, supranote 128,
at 114 (criticizing general verdicts because they make it impossible for trial judges or the
parties to know whether the jury correctly applied the courts instructions or missaplied
or misunderstood them). Judge Frank finds much fault with the system of trial by jury
and, lamenting that the right to a jury trial is probably too ingrained to ever go away, he
recommends that special verdicts would be a step in the right direction. Id. at 139-41.
165. See, e.g., GUI4THER, supra note 144, at 70; LEHMAN, supra note 158, at 16.
166. See MANN, supra note 145, at 79. The initiation of special verdicts could be
a two-way street. Juries were permitted to report that while they reached a decision with
regard to the factual disputes, they chose to refer the application of the law and verdict
to the bench. Id. While sometimes juries returned special verdicts because they were
unable to agree on the final outcome, "[t]he phenomenon ofjuries admitting that they did
not know how to apply the law to the facts they had found was, at the very least, an
admission of their limitations." Id.
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instructions suggest a widely held belief to the contrary. Once it became the law
1 67
of the land that juries must apply the law as determined and given by the court,
judges employed a number of methods to avoid entrusting juries with
comprehending and applying legal principles. Recommendations regarding the
correct verdict and the use of special verdicts served to relieve juries of the
burden of grappling with incomprehensible instructions.
3. Late Twentieth Century Through the Present: Pattern Instructions
Of course, for quite a number of years now American trial courts have been
delivering relatively 68 uniform jury instructions. Pattern instructions found in
texts and manuals grew partly out of a concern that instructions were
unintelligible. 69 Despite this, commissions charged with drafting uniform
Most
instructions made little effort to ensure comprehensibility. 70
commissioners (lawyers, judges, legislators), knew little of semantics or

167. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895).
168. I say relatively because in modem day courts one will frequently hear varying
renditions of legal principles. See, e.g., Robert C. Power, Reasonableand OtherDoubts:
The ProblemofJury Instructions,67 TENN. L. REV. 45,56 (1999) (claiming that there are
a number of different pattern reasonable doubt instructions). This is because jury
instruction manuals often offer alternatives among approved instructions. Nevertheless,
in the pre-manual days there was little consistency between trial judges, which kept
appellate courts plenty busy. See NIELAND, supranote 57, at 16-18. In his monograph,
Robert G. Nieland points out the ironic discovery that at least one post-pattern
instructions study found that there was not a significant reduction in the number of
appeals or reversals based upon claims of erroneous jury instructions. Id. at 17 (citing
Robert G. Nieland, Assessing the Impact of PatternJury Instructions, 62 JUDICATURE
185 (1978)).
169. See ELWORK ET AL., supra note 8, at 5; NIELAND, supra note 57, at 22; Note,
StandardJury Instructions,98 U. PA. L. REv. 223, 224 (1949) (describing the partially
complete California Book of Standard Jury Instructions as setting "forth legal principles
• . . in simple language"). Interestingly, the common perception is that pattern
instructions were developed to enhance comprehensibility. See McDowell v. Calderon,
130 F.3d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Jury instructions are onlyjudge-made attempts to
recast the words of statutes and the elements of crimes into words and terms
comprehensible to the layperson."). According to Nieland, additional reasons for the
creation ofpattern instructions were the desire for consistency, impartiality, accuracy and
time-saving. See generally NIELAND, supranote 57, at 13-22 (listing and explaining the
goals of the development of pattern instructions). Early efforts to supply pattern
instructions to trial judges looked like forms. See, e.g., ROBERT L. MCBRIDE, THE ART
OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY (1969). Trial courts could access a sample of a particular type
of charge, usually containing a particular set of facts, and tailor the charge to suit. See
generally NIELAND, supra note 57, at 5-6 (discussing and listing examples of books of
sample jury instructions).
170. See ELwORK ET AL., supranote 8, at 9; NIELAND, supranote 57, at 22.
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linguistics."" They were, therefore, ill-equipped to translate law into
understandable language. Further, since empirical research on juries and
instructions was largely unavailable at the time,'72 drafters were probably
unaware of the seriousness or magnitude of the problem.
Thus, in the evolution ofjury instructions one can trace the thread of a fear,
if not a firm conviction, that technical instructions would be hard, or impossible,
for lay jurors to understand. Conversely, there are no aspects of this evolution
that can supply a foundation for presuming that jurors comprehend. Indeed, the
history suggests the embrace of precisely the opposite presumption: that
technical legal instructions would be unintelligible to most laypersons.
C. The Rational Connection Requirementfor Presumptions
If the concept that juries understand and follow instructions is, as most
courts maintain, a presumption, it ought to satisfy the legal requirements for a
valid presumption. Long ago the Supreme Court resolved that when
presumptions are utilized in criminal cases there must be a rational connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.'
According to the
Court, a presumption is arbitrary where, in common experience, there is a lack
of connection to the proven fact. 7
For the jury instruction question to fit the presumption model, we should be
able to say that when it is proven that jurors were properly instructed 7 1(fact 1),
it may be presumed that they understood and followed the instructions (fact 2).
For such a presumption to be permitted, there would have to be a rational
connection between the two facts.' 76 In speaking of presumptions the Supreme

171. See NIELAND, supra note 57, at 23.
172. See id.
173. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,467 (1943). See generally Collier,

supra note 39, at 426-60 (tracing the evolution of the use of presumptions in criminal
cases); James F. Ponsoldt, A Due Process Analysis of Judicially-Authorized
Presumptions in Federal Aggravated Bank Robbery Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINoLOGY 363, 369-80 (1983) (analyzing the rational connection requirement); Leo
H. Whinery, Presumptions and Their Effect, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 553, 562-69 (2001)

(discussing standards for finding a rational connection).
174. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 66 (1965) (holding that the
constitutionality of a statutory presumption depends upon the rationality of the

connection between the facts proven and presumed); Tot, 319 U.S. at 467; see also
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-58 (1979); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6, 32-33 (1969); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 5 (1929) (finding the need for a rational
connection between the fact proved and what is to be inferred).
175. In this context "properly instructed" merely means that the instructions
contained correct and comprehensive statements of the relevant law.
176. What makes the connection sufficiently rational? In a 1969 case, Leary v.
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Court has said, "where the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable
relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not competent for the
legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure of courts.""77 Whether

United States, the Supreme Court pronounced that to be deemed a rational connection
the presumed fact must be more likely than not to flow from the basic fact. See Leary,
395 U.S. at 36 (finding an insufficient connection between possession of marijuana and
knowledge that the marijuana was illegally imported into the United States). Later in
County Courtof Ulster County, New York v. Allen, the Court prescribed a modification
holding that in the case of a permissive presumption, see supra note 40 and
accompanying text, the presumed fact should more likely than not flow from the basic
fact in the facts of the case at hand. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 171. However, when it came
to mandatory presumptions, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, the presumed fact
should, on its face and beyond a reasonable doubt, flow from the basic fact. Allen, 442
U.S. at 166-67. Allen created confusion in the already complex law ofpresumptions. See
Graham, supranote 36, at 440 ("The only thing clear after [Allen] is that the case did not
foster clarity."). In fact, in his dissent in Allen, Justice Powell charged that the majority
circumvented the rational basis requirement by allowing the rational connection to be
found in the facts of the case at hand alone even if the connection is not borne out by
history, common sense or experience. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 801-04 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Nevertheless, commentators agree that at least some rational basis
requirement for permissive presumptions survives Allen. See, e.g., Graham,supra note
36, at 441; Harris, supranote 39, at 337. Allen's prescription for different treatment for
permissive versus mandatory presumptions lost much, if not all, of its significance when
the Court in Sandstrom v. Montana and Francisv. Franklinall but outlawed the use of
mandatory presumptions in criminal cases. See supranote 40 and accompanying text.
See generallyCollier, supra note 39, at 435-39 (explaining Sandstrom and Franklinand
the rationale for finding mandatory presumptions unconstitutional).
While at one time it intended to do so, see MICHAEL GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 303.4, at 213-24 (5th ed. 2001), Congress has not passed
legislation or rules on the proper use of permissive presumptions in criminal cases. The
Federal Rules of Evidence speak only to the use of presumptions in civil proceedings.
See FED. R. EViD. 301. The Federal Advisory Committee's Proposed Rule 303 (now
Standard 303) covers presumptions in criminal cases. It authorizes only permissive
presumptions and allows their use when the presumed fact establishes guilt or an element
of the offense or negatives a defense only when a reasonable juror on the evidence as a
whole, could find guilt or the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See GRAHAM,
supra,§ 303.4, at 213-24; cf. Collier, supranote 39, at 439-55 (arguing and describing
empirical evidence that jurors perceive that so-called permissive presumptions are
mandatory); Harris, supra note 39, at 341 (suggesting that the distinction between
mandatory and permissive presumptions is lost on most jurors). In any event, the
resolution of the precise standard for the rational connection test is not necessary to the
thesis of this Article. The jury instruction presumption lacks the benefit of a rational
connection under either test.
177. See Tot, 319 U.S. at 468. The Court expressed the same opinion with respect
to judicially created presumptions in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802 (1989). In
Smith, the Court considered the breadth of the "presumption of vindictiveness" which it
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presumption or rule, the premise that jurors understand instructions is arguably
one of the most important principles governing our trial court system."' Given
the nature ofjury instructions" a criminal defendant's access to justice depends
in large part upon jurors understanding their instructions. 8 ° Because it is such
a crucial link"8 ' in a party's access to a just verdict,' there should be, at the very

had previously created in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969), for
situations in which a criminal defendant is retried after a successful appeal and receives
a harsher sentence. Smith involved a defendant who was tried after a successful motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. See Smith, 490 U.S. at 795. In refusing to extend the
"presumption of vindictiveness," the Court reasoned "when a greater penalty is imposed
after trial than was imposed after a prior guilty plea, the increase in sentence is not more
likely than not attributable to the vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge." Id.
at 801.
178. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
179. Jurors in criminal cases are instructed on a broad range of topics. See, e.g.,
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CRIMINAL 9 (7th ed. 2004); FLORIDA STANDARD JURY

INSTRUCTIONS- CRIMINAL §§ 3.1-3.13 (4th ed. 2002). The order and procedures of the
trial are described. See, e.g., 8TH CIR. MODEL JURY INSTR.- CRIM. 1.09 (2003). Jurors
are told the elements of the offenses charged and many of the elements' terms are
defined. See, e.g., id. at 6.18.111 (providing and defining elements of the crime of
assaulting a federal officer). More generally, they are instructed about the presumption
of innocence, the prosecutor's burden of proof and the definition of reasonable doubt.
See, e.g., CAL. JURY INsTR.- CRIM. 2.90 (2004); FLA. JURY INSTR.- CRIM. 3.7 (2002);
HAw.PATTERN JURY INSTR.- CRIM. 3.02 (2002). In any given case they may also be
instructed regarding the elements of self-defense, see, e.g., 8TH CIR. MODEL JURY INSTR.CRIM. 9.04 (2003), intoxication or drug use, see, e.g., id. at 9.06, insanity, see, e.g., id.
at 9.03, not to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's failure to testify, see, e.g.,
id. at 4.01, the proper consideration of accomplice testimony, see, e.g., id. at 4.05, or
eyewitness testimony, see, e.g., id. at 4.08.
180. Nowhere is this more true than in the penalty phase of a capital trial. See infra
notes 273-81 and accompanying text. Given the stakes, access to justice is especially
crucial. Pursuant to the Constitution, the jurors' function walks a finely defined line
between narrowly and broadly defined discretion. Death penalty jurisprudence requires
that jurors be instructed that a defendant is eligible for a death sentence only under
narrowly defined circumstances. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 263 (1976); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972). Yet, penalty phase jurors are also
instructed that they must give consideration to a broad range of mitigating evidence when
offered by a defendant. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 393-94 (1988) (citing
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
181. See United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388,392 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
that "[a]mid a sea of facts and inferences, instructions are the jury's only compass").
182. The government's quest for a just verdict is likewise tied to the jury's ability
to understand instructions. It has been suggested that what has been labeled juror
nullification in some cases is simply an example ofjurors honestly misunderstanding the
state of the law. See Ellsworth, supra note 137, at 222.
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least, a rational basis for the presumption that when jurors are instructed on the
law, they understand those instructions.
In examining the connection for rationality, the questions of whether jurors
follow and whether they understand instructions, deserve separate treatment. Of
course jurors need to understand before they can follow instructions. However,
as discussed below, to the extent that they are able to comprehend some or all of
an instruction, there may be rational support for a presumption that the correctly
understood instruction will be followed. On the other hand, it is far less logical
to presume that all instructions are understood.
The presumption that jurors follow instructions that they understand is
83
based on two considerations. One, discussed at length infra,"
is that the jury
system cannot function without it. The other is that it is a logical assumption that
when a juror takes an oath, he or she will appreciate the seriousness of the task
and endeavor to faithfully carry it out.' 4 Part of the oath requires following the
instructions of the court.' The two facts rationally connected are that when
jurors make sworn promises (fact 1), they will keep them (fact 2). For this
presumption to have a sufficient rationale, we need to feel comfortable
concluding that in the majority of cases jurors will exercise their free will and
choose, to the best of their ability, 18 6 to follow instructions. This is a more

183. See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
184. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 (1985) (commenting that "jurors,
conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial
court's instructions in a criminal case"); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262,264-65 (1970)
(reaffirming that "it cannot be supposed that once such people take their oaths as jurors
theywill be unable 'to follow conscientiously the instructions of a trial judge"') (quoting
Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 484 (1969)); KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 77, at
149-62 (documenting that jurors distinguish simple from more complicated cases, ask
questions when they need to and usually understand the facts of a case); LEHMAN, supra
note 158, at 11 (lauding jurors' sense ofresponsibility and quoting Lord Acton: "'Power
shared equally with others, all strangers to it and held briefly, tends to ennoble');
Bradley Saxton, How Well Do JurorsUnderstandJury Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 109 (1998);
Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Jury Instructions: A PersistentFailure
to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REv. 77, 98 (1988) (revealing that their experiment
"demonstrates that a typical jury makes a good faith effort to use its instructions for the
purpose intended").
185. Typically, the oath asked ofjurors is as follows: "Do you solemnly swear (or
affirm) that you will well and truly try the issues between the State of__ and the
defendant and render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence, so help you
God." See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-170 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606:2 (1999).
186. I say "best of their ability" because admittedly some instructions are too
difficult to follow. Aside from the problem of comprehension discussed infra, some
limiting or cautionary instructions may go beyond ajuror's ability to clear his or her mind
of evidence. See supra note 59. This would be true despite the juror's willingness to
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comfortable connection than
the one required for the presumption that the
87
instructions are understood.
In the latter case the two facts that should be rationally connected are that
when jurors are given instructions (fact 1), they understand them (fact 2).
However, even the best-intentioned juror, desirous of fulfilling his or her oath,
has little control over his or her ability to comprehend legalistic instructions.
While the presumption that ajuror will follow instructions largely depends upon
the will of the juror, for the most part the presumption that the juror understands
instructions does not.'88

D. EmpiricalEvidence
Demanding rationality fails to sufficiently define the requirements for
presumptions. As the Supreme Court has noted, "the determination ofrationality
is, by its nature, highly empirical."'8 9 Whether or not it is rational to presume
that jurors understand instructions should to a significant extent be determined
by reference to empirical data. The empirical studies find that, at least for some
important instructions, it is neither rational nor logical to conclude that instructed
jurors understand what they have been told.'"

cooperate. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 250

(1987). In these cases the presumption that jurors follow instructions is based upon
practical considerations alone. See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text; cf supra
note 59 (discussing Bruton v.United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968), where the
Supreme Court found that under certain circumstances, the potential for unfairness
outweighed the practical benefits of joint trials).
187. This is borne out empirically as well. See Steele & Thomburg, supra note
184, at 208 (comparing data on jurors' efforts to follow instructions and their abilities).
188. Theoretically, ajuror's ability to understand instructions is affected by his or
her motivation. Presumably a juror committed to fulfilling his or her function in
accordance with the oath will try harder to understand instructions than a juror lacking
that commitment. Some studies purporting to prove that jurors misunderstand
instructions have been criticized on the grounds that the jury surveys or questionnaires
fail to duplicate the seriousness of an actual courtroom setting in which a juror is far
more likely to make all efforts to understand the court's instructions. See infra note 245.
In any event, instructions that are very difficult to understand or even incomprehensible
will not be understood by even the most highly motivated juror.
189. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965). The Gainey Court
stressed that in the case of statutorily created presumptions one would expect the
legislature to "amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it." Id.
190. See infra notes 191-211 and accompanying text.
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For more than twenty years19' social scientists and linguists have been

conducting experiments to determine whether jurors are apt to understand many
of the more commonly issued legal instructions. 92 The published findings reveal
many comprehensibility problems. 93 Across the board, the studies fail to
provide an ounce of foundation for the jury instruction presumption.' 94
The leading studies are fairly consistent in their strongest criticisms: pattern
jury instructions are predictably misunderstood due to problems with the timing
of delivery and the failure of the drafters to understand linguistics.'" In one of
the first studies, Professors Robert P. Charrow and Veda R. Charrow examined
a number of California's pattern civil jury instructions and identified various

linguistic constructions that, theoretically, could have an impact on a jury's
comprehension.' 96 For example, the researchers suspected that the overuse of
nominalizations (nouns that are derived from verbs),' 97 the use oftechnical legal

191. The first truly comprehensive study of the comprehensibility of jury
instructions was reported in 1979 by Professors Robert P. Charrow and Veda R.
Charrow. See Charrow & Charrow, supra note 8;see also Dumas, supranote 122, at 721
(commenting that the Charrows' article was a "pioneering effort on the topic of jury
instructions"). There were a number of studies on the subject prior to the Charrows'
work, but these were somewhat more narrow in focus. See, e.g., Amiram Elwork et al.,
JuridicDecisions: In Ignoranceof the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
163 (1977). See generally Charrow & Charrow, supra note 8, at 1308 n.8 (listing and
categorizing the studies conducted up until 1979).
192. See, e.g., ELWORK ET AL., supra note 8, at 43-73; Geoffrey P. Kramer &
Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand CriminalJuryInstructions? Analyzing the
Results of the Michigan JurorComprehension Project,23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401
(1990); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in CapitalSentencing Instructions:
Guided orMisguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995); Steele & Thomburg, supra note 184.
See generally Dumas, supra note 122, at 721-31 (digesting and explaining important
studies); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, JurorComprehensionandPublicPolicy:
PerceivedProblems andProposedSolutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &L. 788-89 (2000)
(listing jury instruction comprehension studies).
193. See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supranote 8, at 1331-41; Luginbuhl & Howe,
supra note 192, at 1166-82; Steele & Thomburg, supra note 184, at 90-98.
194. See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 192, at 800 (concluding that "the
research record overwhelmingly indicates that judicial instructions are not clear");
Valerie P. Hans, Jury DecisionMaking, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 56,67
(D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) ("Juryresearchers are nearly unanimous in the
view that jurors have trouble understanding and following the judge's legal
instructions."); ChristopherN. May, "WhatDo WeDoNow?": HelpingJuriesApply the
Instructions, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 872 (1995) ("Studies literally abound
demonstrating the extent to which jurors misapprehend the relevant law.").
195. See, e.g., ELWORK ET AL., supranote 8, at 17-24; Charrow & Charrow, supra
note 8, at 1317-28; Liebernan & Sales, supranote 58, at 596-97.
196. See Charrow & Charrow, supranote 8, at 1308-11.
197. For example, an instruction intended to refer to a person'sfailingto recollect,
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phrases, 9 and the use of double or even triple negatives'" contributed to poor
comprehension levels.2 0 In their experiment,2"' Professors Charrow and
Charrow sought to determine whether and to what extent these constructions
interfered with comprehension and whether the subject instructions, rewritten
with improved attention to the connection between linguistic construction and
comprehension, would be more easily understood.2 2 The researchers found that
juror comprehension of the pattern instructions was low (less than fifty
percent)20 3 and that comprehension went up significantly (by as much as ninetythree percent) when jurors were given the rewritten instructions.' 4
Later studies of various civil and criminal instructions, employing various
methodologies,2 5 all point to the same conclusion: many pattern jury

refers to the "failureofrecollection." See id. at 1322.
198. Examples provided in the study are "'credibility,' 'proximate cause,' 'deem'
and 'stipulate."' See id. at 1324.
199. The California jury instructions studied contained six instances of double or
triple negatives. Id. at 1325. Two of these phrases illustrate the point: 'without which
the injury would not have happened;' 'innocent misrecollection is not uncommon."' Id.
200. Id. at 1317-28. The researchers performed specialized analyses in order to
isolate some of the variables that impacted comprehension. They studied instruction
complexity, linguistic structure (the use and placement of "as to," sentence length,
misplaced phrases, use of the passive construction, use of long word lists, discourse
structure, use of embeddings or subordinate clauses) and demographics (subjects'
education, occupation, legal training, prior jury service, past military service, age, sex,
native language and other variables). Id. By comparing the subjects' comprehension of
pattern with revisedjury instructions, the Charrows were able to study the impact ofthese
variables. Id. at 1331-41.
201. As with most social science experiments, the methodology forjuryinstruction
comprehension studies varies with the researcher. In the Charrows' study pre-recorded
instructions were played for groups of randomly selected prospective jurors. See
generally id. at 1311-14 (providing a detailed description of the experiment). The
subjects were then asked to orally paraphrase the instructions. Id. The responses were
taped for later study by the researchers. The rewritten instructions were similarly tested.
Id. at 1328-30.
202. Id. at 1321, 1328-31.
203. Id. at 1314-17.
204. Id. at 1331-41. Of course, Part II of the experiment, testing rewritten
instructions, was crucial. Id. at 1317. The researchers concede that, because their study,
by design, did not duplicate the conditions surrounding the actual giving of instructions
in a trial setting, the results of the testing of the pattern instructions are not conclusive
proof regarding their comprehensibility. Id. Nevertheless, by rewriting the instructions
to correct for problematic linguistic constructions, the Charrows were able to make
reliable findings regarding how comprehension could be greatly improved. Id.
205. Steele and Thomburg, like the Charrows, used prospective jurors as subjects
and asked them to paraphrase both pattern and revised instructions that were played on
audiotape. The subjects' responses were taped for later analysis. See Steele &
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instructions are not properly understood by jurors.20 6 Most significantly, many
of these studies show that artfully rewriting difficult to understand instructions
greatly improves comprehension.2 7
Of greatest importance, and most disturbing, are empirical studies testing
the comprehensibility of crucial instructions in death penalty cases. 20 ' Here
again, social scientists conclude that instructions are not comprehensible. 2 9 Few

Thomburg, supra note 184, at 89-90. Alternative methods of subject selection include:
testing actual jurors immediately after their service, see Kramer & Koenig, supra note
192, at 406; Saxton, supra note 184, at 75-77, testing college students, see Elwork et al.,
supra note 191, at 170, and testing randomly selected jury-eligible citizens, see Shari
Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and
TestingJury Instructions,79 JUDICATURE 224, 226 (1996). Alternative testing methods
include: showing subjects videotapes ofjudges delivering instructions, see Elwork et al.,
supra note 191, at 170, asking subjects to complete questionnaires designed to test their
understanding, see id.; Kramer & Koenig, supranote 192, at 406-08; Saxton, supranote
184, at 77-81, and conducting interviews of subjects to determine comprehension levels,
see Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 192, at 1161-62.
206. See, e.g., Elwork et al., supranote 191, at 175-78 (finding that tested pattern
instructions were so difficult to understand that their use was no better than providing no
instructions at all); Saxton, supra note 184, at 86-102 (finding that jurors did not
understand instructions as well as they thought they had but that jurors in criminal cases
displayed greater understanding than jurors in civil trials); Steele & Thornburg, supra
note 184, at 92 (concluding that "comprehension byjurors ofthe instructions given them
is dysfunctionally low").
207. See, e.g., ELWORK ET AL., supranote 8, at 43-64; Charrow & Charrow, supra
note 8, at 1341-58; Steele & Thomburg, supra note 184, at 90-94. The fact that pattern
instructions can be rewritten to improve comprehension hardly means that they have
been. See Ellsworth, supra note 137, at 216 (arguing that "[i]t appears not that the calls
of the social scientists were considered and rejected, but rather that they were simply
ignored"); Tanford, Law Reform, supra note 5, at 164-67 (studying the impact of
empirical research on appellate courts, legislatures and commissions and concluding that
the research has had little influence on courts or legislatures); see also Tiersma, supra
note 5, at 1085-99 (citing the lack of receptiveness of courts to comprehension research
and expressing optimism that reform commissions hold the best hope for improving the
language of jury instructions).
208. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The CapitalJury Project: Rationale,Design,
and Preview ofEarly Findings,70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995); Diamond & Levi, supranote
205; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 192.
209. See, e.g., Diamond & Levi, supra note 205, at 225 (confirming conclusions
of Professor Hans Zeisel that instructions in capital cases do not provide adequate
guidance); Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 192, at 1166-72 (reporting that test subject
jurors had a poor understanding of how to evaluate aggravating and mitigating factors,
burdens of proof and unanimity requirements); see also Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood
Abuse and Adult Murder: Implicationsfor the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143,
1202-04 (1999) (arguing that jury instructions do not adequately guide the jury's
consideration of childhood abuse as a mitigating factor).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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would find the data surprising. Overuse of legal jargon, unfamiliar use of
grammar and sentence organization are just a few reasons to question the
likelihood that commonly used instructions are understood.
Just as a picture is worth a thousand words, a sample of actual language
contained in a penalty phase instruction is worth a thousand descriptions:
"If, from your consideration of the evidence and after your due
deliberation, there is at least one of you who finds that there is at least
one mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death
sentence then you should return a verdict that the Defendant be
sentenced to imprisonment. On the other hand, if from your
consideration of the evidence and after due deliberation you
unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude the imposition of the death sentence then you should return
a verdict that the Defendant be sentenced to death."...
...

"If you unanimously find from your consideration of all the

evidence that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude
imposition of a sentence of death then you should return a verdict
imposing a sentence of death. If, on the other hand, you do not
unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude the imposition of a sentence of death then you should return
a verdict that the sentence of death should not be imposed.1 0
When capital case researchers have rewritten instructions with these
shortcomings in mind, they have found a significant improvement in
comprehension."
Logically speaking, and as the Supreme Court has recognized, whether or
not a legal presumption has a rational basis ought, at least in part, be determined
by reference to empirical data.2" To say the very least, the data does not support
the rationality of a presumption that jury instructions are adequately understood.
One could persuasively argue that it suggests just the opposite.

210. See Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting the trial court's
instruction to the jury regarding their consideration of mitigation in the penalty phase of
a capital case). From these words the jurors were meant to understand and apply fairly
complicated rules concerning inter alia that they need not find a mitigating factor
unanimously before taking it into account. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,373-75
(1988); see also Aggravation andMitigation in CapitalCases: What Do JurorsThink?,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1543 (1998) (presenting findings of the Capital Jury Project
that jurors do not correctly understand the unanimity requirements). See generally
Bowers, supra note 208, at 1044-62 (providing a legal history of penalty phase
parameters); Tiersma, supranote 70, at 3-10 (outlining the law of mitigation evidence).
211. See, e.g., Diamond & Levi, supra note 205, at 227-30.
212. See supranote 189 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

39

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 8
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 69

E. Policy and Practicalities
An oft-cited and noteworthy basis for the presumption is its practical
necessity.2 13 The thinking behind this rationale is that the jury system could not
function without a presumption that when jurors are given instructions, they
understand and follow them.2" 4 This idea accounts for the urgent language
accompanying the articulation of the presumption 2 -- e.g., "[a] crucial
assumption, 21 6 "our system of trial by jury is premised on the assumption,""1 7
and "[w]e also deem it essential . . to apply the well-recognized
presumption....""'
In the world of evidentiary presumptions, however, practicalities may not
replace the required rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
presumed." 9 Arguably the same rule should apply to the jury instruction
213. See, e.g., Gray v.Maryland, 523 U.S. 185,201 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). Professor J. Alexander Tanford
postulates that one reason the Supreme Court is unreceptive to psychological evidence
regardingjurybehavior is that it is at odds with institutional efficiency. See Tanford, The
Limits of Scientific Jurisprudence,supranote 5, at 162.
214. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985); Parker v. Randolph,
442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979), abrogatedby Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
215. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
216. See Parker,442 U.S. at 73 (emphasis added).
217. See United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 756 (1st Cir. 1999).
218. See United States v. Brown, 983 F.2d 201, 202 (11th Cir. 1993).
219. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,469-70 (1943). The federal statutory
presumption at issue in Tot provided that possession of a firearm by a prior offender or
fugitive was presumptive evidence that the firearm was shipped, transported or received
in interstate or foreign commerce. Id. at 464. In invalidating this mandatorypresumption
the Court rejected the government's argument of comparative convenience. Id. at 467.
The fact that it may have been more convenient for the defendant to produce evidence
regarding where or how he obtained a particular firearm, was deemed an insufficient
justification for apresumption unless there was arational connection between the proven
and presumed facts. Id. Relative convenience is, quite often, the motivation behind the
creation of an evidentiary presumption. See Harris, supra note 39, at 310-11 ("Courts
and legislatures create ... presumptions expressly for the sake of manipulating one ofthe
burdens of proof."); Laurie A. Briggs, Note, PresumptiveMens Rea; An Analysis of the
FederalJudiciary'sRetreatfrom Sandstrom v. Montana, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 367,
368 (1989). For example, presumptions are frequently created to ease the prosecutor's
burden of producing evidence of a defendant's intent. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (involving an instruction that the law "presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts"); Barnes v. United States, 412
U.S. 837, 839-40 (1973) (evaluating presumption of knowledge that property is stolen
from proof of possession of stolen property). Barring a confession, it can be difficult to
secure proof of an individual's state of mind. A legislatively created presumption
alleviates the prosecutor's burden of producing such evidence. The prosecutor must
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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presumption.22 Since the jury presumption is a somewhat different animal,22 '
however, the practicalities require closer examination.
Justice Antonin Scalia champions the notion that the effective functioning
of the American jury system depends upon the jury instruction presumption. 2
He candidly explains that the presumption governs, not so much because we
have confidence in its truth, but because it represents a fair accommodation of
the government's interest in efficiency.223
As was true for the rational connection analysis,224 for an analysis of policy
concerns, presumptions that jurors understand and thatjurors follow instructions
should be considered separately. Let us first consider the latter presumption, that
jurors follow instructions.225 On countless occasions jurors are given limiting
instructions directing them to disregard pieces of evidence226 or to consider
evidence for limited purposes only. 227 Likewise, whenjurors are given important
instructions to, for example, refrain from exposure to media coverage of the

merely persuade the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact they have been
instructed they may presume.
220. The Tot Court does appear to restrict its rejection of the convenience argument
to mandatory presumptions. See Tot, 319 U.S. at 469-70. However, in the next
important presumption cases the Court required a rational connection for a permissive
presumption as well. See United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 141 (1965); United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 66-68 (1965) (deferring to the legislative finding of a
rational connection between a defendant's unexplained presence at an illegal still and
guilt of illegally operating a distilling business); see also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6, 35-36 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional a presumption similar to that in Romano and
Gainey because it could not be "said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend").
Nevertheless, the jury instruction presumption, even if rebuttable, is more analogous to
mandatory presumptions than it is to permissive presumptions.
221. See supra notes 48, 66-69 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 201 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
223. See Richardson,481 U.S. at 211. In Justice Scalia's own words:
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic
one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in
the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the
interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.
Id.
224. See supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text.
225. Of course this could only apply to the instructions that they understand.
226. See, e.g., United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1184 (7th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11 th Cir. 1997).
227. See, e.g., Richardson,481 U.S. at 211 (sanctioning a direction to the jury to
consider a codefendant's statement against him alone); United States v. Del Mundo, No.
95-10403, 1996 WL 534039, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 1996) (limiting the relevance of
certain evidence to the issue of intent).
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case, 228 not discuss the case during the trial, 2 9 or not consider the question of
sentencing, 2 0 courts presume that these directions will be followed. 23' To some
extent a presumption that jurors follow instructions is vital to the functioning of
the system. Not believing that jurors do their best and are usually successful in
following a court's directives could have arguably unacceptable consequences.
Evidence could not be received for limited purposes. Perhaps more importantly,
if jurors were not trusted to follow cautionary instructions to disregard
improperly offered evidence, a mistrial would have to be ordered each time the
jurors heard something they should not have heard.
On the other hand, there is far less practical necessity to cling to a
presumption that all jury instructions are understood. Instructions can be tested
for comprehensibility. 232 Instructions failing these empirical tests can be
redrafted and retested.233

228. See, e.g., Raulerson v. Wainwright, 753 F.2d 869, 874-75 (11th Cir. 1985).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998).
230. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584 (1994); United States
v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1993).
231. In these types of cases the presumption is rebuttable. Mistrials or appellate
reversals remain a possibility if the court receives evidence of a violation of certain
cautionary instructions or ofjury tampering. See generally Commonwealth v. Sinnott,
507 N.E.2d 699, 711-12 (Mass. 1987) (considering claim that jurors were exposed to
media reports during course of the trial); People v. Budzyn, 566 N.W.2d 229, 234-48
(Mich. 1997) (analyzing claims that defendants' convictions should be reversed because
of jury's exposure to extrinsic influences).
232. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
233. See Diamond & Levi, supranote 205, at 232 (arguing that revised instructions
should be pre-tested); William H. Erickson, CriminalJury Instructions, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 285, 292-93 (suggesting that both lawyers and judges have the responsibility of
composing more comprehensible instructions); Leiberman & Sales, supra note 58, at
623-26. See generallyElwork et al., supranote 191, at 145-81. In Gacy v. Welborn, 994
F.2d 305, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit suggested that there are most likely
limits on our ability to make instructions understandable. The court hypothesized three
reasons for this: that the rules conveyed are too complex, that the concepts used are too
complex, and that jurors may be unable to grasp unfamiliar thoughts regardless of the
manner in which they are explained. Id. at 311. If in fact some legal concepts cannot be
understood by lay persons despite all efforts at improving comprehensibility, this can
hardly be a justification for continuing the presumption that they can.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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Jury system reform has gained momentum in recent years.234 Without a
doubt, instruction on the law is not the only aspect of jury trials that requires
attention. For example, reforms have been considered or made to the jury
selection process, 235 the question of juror note-taking,23 s and the possibility of
case-related juror discussion prior to deliberations.23 However, few significant
changes have been implemented regarding the wording of instructions, 238 with
few successful efforts at improving comprehension. 239

234. See, e.g., Steven W. Fisher, PatternInstructionsfor Jurorsin CriminalCases
Seek to Explain FundamentalLegal Principles,73 N.Y. ST. B.J. 29 (2001); Valerie P.
Hans et al., The Arizona Jury Reform PermittingCivilJury TrialDiscussions:The Views
of Trial Participants,Judges, and Jurors, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 349 (1999)
(stating that "[i]n 1995, the Supreme Court of Arizona approved a sweeping set of
changes in the state's jury system"); J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon
Commission on JurySystem Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433 (1996). See generally
Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 192, at 800-17 (describing and evaluating reform
efforts); Franklin Strier, The Roadto Reform: Judges on Juries andAttorneys, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1249, 1250-63 (1997) (enumerating reforms and surveying judicial
response).
235. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (reforming the requirements
for establishing discrimination from the use of peremptory challenges); Kelso, supranote
234, at 1474-88 (describing California commission's recommendations for change injury
selection practices).
236. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona
Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280 (1996); Kelso, supra note 234, at 1504. See generally
Douglas G. Smith, StructuralandFunctionalAspectsofthe Jury: ComparativeAnalysis
and Proposalsfor Reform, 48 ALA. L. REv. 441,567-78 (1997) (analyzing note-taking
reform proposals).
237. See Hans et al., supra note 234, at 350; Kelso, supranote 234, at 1508.
238. Reforms have been considered and implemented regarding the timing of the
delivery of instructions. See Dann & Logan, supra note 236, at 281; William W.
Schwarzer, Communicatingwith Juries: ProblemsandRemedies, 69 CAL. L. REv. 731,
755-56 (1981). See generally Strier, supra note 234, at 1255-56 (surveying judges
regarding preinstruction and discussing evidence supporting it). Traditionally, jurors are
instructed on the law after the close of the evidence and the completion of counsel's
closing arguments. Studies have revealed that delivering at least some instructions on the
law at the outset of the trial or during critical points in the trial is beneficial. See id.; see
also LAURENCE H. GELLER & PETER HEMENWAY, LAST CHANCE FOR JUSTICE: THE
JUROR'S LONELY QUEST 298-300 (1997) (recommending instructions be given pre-trial,

during trial and at the trial's conclusion). See generally Leiberman & Sales, supra note
58, at 628-32 (detailing the pros and cons of preinstructions and summarizing relevant
empirical studies).
239. See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 192, at 788; Tiersma, supra note 5, at
1085; cf. Fisher, supra note 234, at 29-30 (lamenting the difficulties in making New
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Despite its lack of grounding, the jury instruction presumption prevails. It
should not. There is neither a legal nor a practical rationale for the judiciary's
subscription to it. It is both illogical and unfair for our courts to presume that
jurors understand that which the evidence shows us they do not. At least for
now, the jury instruction presumption should be abandoned.
The desirability of operating from a premise that when instructed, jurors
will understand the law, cannot be denied.2" The premise, however, must be
trustworthy. Properly rewritten and pre-tested instructions might be worthy of
presumed comprehension. Research suggests that this can be accomplished."'
These reforms will, no doubt, require the joint efforts of lawyers, jurists, linguists
and social scientists. Pre-testing newly revised instructions is key.2 2 In light of
the evidence showing that currently used pattern instructions are overly difficult
to understand, to be worthy of a comprehension presumption, new pattern243
instructions ought to be put to the test.
The value of empirical testing is a bit controversial, as questions have been
raised regarding the reliability and significance of the tests.2 " Arguments have

York's jury instructions more understandable and calling upon the state legislature to
amend statutory definitions of crimes with an eye toward making them more easily
understood by jurors); Kelso, supra note 234, at 1510-17 (laying out California
commission's recommendations on simplifying instructions).
240. Presuming the opposite would be absurd. However, until the
comprehensibility of revised instructions can be proven, it would be preferable to make
no presumptions and leave room for litigants to offer convincing evidence with regard
to the comprehensibility of any given set of instructions. While this may invite timeconsuming legal challenges, it is nevertheless more appropriate than clinging to an
unfounded presumption.
241. See supra notes 207, 211 and accompanying text.
242. See Diamond & Levi, supranote 205, at 232. Diamond and Levi highlight
the pitfalls in revising instructions but then implementing them without testing their
efficacy. Id. (arguing that "testing is necessary to assess when an acceptable level of
performance has been achieved and to identify where further efforts at improvement
should be made"); see also Dumas, supranote 122, at 714 (arguing that "[t]esting pattern
instructions for comprehensibility could guarantee a higher rate of comprehension than
we can guarantee now"). Studies testing instructions that were revised to improve
comprehensibility revealed that comprehension improved with the first round of
revisions, but improvement levels improved even more after a second rewrite process.
See ELWORK ET AL., supra note 8, at 45-46.
243. Having pattern or uniform jury instructions is, generally speaking, a good
thing. They save the trial court's time, assure consistency and make it less likely that an
instruction will be erroneous. See ELWORK ET AL., supra note 8, at 7-8; Leiberman &
Sales, supra note 58, at 590-91.
244. See Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700,705-06 (7th Cir. 1993); Gacy v. Welborn, 994
F.2d 305,311 (7th Cir. 1993); ELWORKET AL.,supra note 8, at 43-69; Saxton, supranote
184, at 75-76.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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been made that test subjects, even if chosen from those called for jury duty, do
not have the same motivation to make as strong an effort to comprehend
instructions as those who know they are sitting in judgment in a real case.245
Some experiments are also criticized for lacking a factual context. 2 " Those who
question the reliability of testing also argue that in a true trial setting
comprehension is likely to be enhanced through the deliberative process, i.e.,
jurors will gain increased understanding by discussing the meaning of
instructions amongst themselves.247 Lastly, critics of juror comprehension
studies query whether low comprehension results are simply the best that can be
expected given the intricacies of the law and legal concepts.248
Perhaps no testing environment can perfectly duplicate the experience of a
sworn juror receiving instructions after hearing and seeing live testimony and
exhibits. Nevertheless, many, if not all of the questions raised above have been
satisfactorily resolved by researchers. 49 Many have addressed the motivation
concern by surveying jurors' comprehension just after delivering a verdict in a
real case.25 This approach serves the added purpose of providing a complete
factual context for the test jurors. In other experiments a factual context is
provided through the use of videotaped summaries of testimony or written sets
of facts.2 ' As to the assertion that deliberations significantly enhance

245. See Free, 12 F.3d at 705 (finding comprehension testing flawed because of
lack of comparability between the test setting and the courtroom setting). The Freecourt
also posited that the test jurors' poor performance might signify nothing more than that
they are poor test takers. Id. at 705-06.
246. See ELWORKETAL.,supra note 8, at 134.

247. See Free,12 F.3d at 705-06; see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 381
(1990) (reasoning that any juror confusion may be "thrashed out in the deliberative
process, with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has
taken place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting").
248. See Gacy, 994 F.2d at 311-12.
249. See generallyELWORK ET AL., supra note 8, at 64-69 (explaining why they
were satisfied with the representativeness of their testing sessions).
250. See, e.g., Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understandingofthe Law in Real
Cases, 16 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 539, 539-54 (1992). Reifman, Spencer Gusick, and
Phoebe Ellsworth tested both previously instructed and uninstructed groups and found

no difference in comprehension of substantive law between the two. While there was a
significant difference in comprehension of procedural law, both groups had a
comprehension rate under fifty percent. Id.; see also Kramer & Koenig, supranote 192,
at 406; Saxton, supra note 184, at 76-77 (testing comprehension ofjurors immediately

after delivering a verdict). It is worth considering that test subjects might, derive
motivation from the self-image concerns that could attach from being quizzed on one's
understanding of complex concepts. Some subjects will want to impress an interviewer
with their intelligence or ability to be a quick study.
251. See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supranote 8, at 1313 (presenting a picture of
an automobile accident and written description of the events); Garvey et al., supra note
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comprehension, researchers find the impact to be minimal.252 Finally, the
criticism that poor comprehension of jury instructions may simply be an
unavoidable consequence of our complicated set of laws has been answered by
studies showing significant gains in comprehension levels when instructions are
rewritten.253 Thus, despite its imperfections, pre-testing new pattern instructions
goes a long way toward establishing a basis for a new comprehension
presumption.
During their deliberations, juries have the option of sending notes to the
court asking for clarification of parts of the court's instructions.254 The questions
in these notes document that certain instructions cause more confusion than
others.255 When juries send notes to the judge, it is in the context of a real case
after the conclusion of both sides' proof and closing argument. Therefore, as a
supplement to field or laboratory testing, a study of frequently asked jury
questions should supply additional feedback on the effectiveness of revised
instructions.
The baseless presumption that jurors understand a judge's responses to the
their questions about the law256 is, if anything, even more disturbing than the
primary presumption. The second presumption is so troubling because trial
judges usually respond by simply rereading, but not re-phrasing or explaining,
the instruction.257 Moreover, a presumption of understanding is particularly
irrational in this context since the asking of the question seems to rebut the
notion that the instruction was understood. To re-instruct the jury using the exact
same language and then presume the response was understood is senseless.
There ought not be a presumption of understanding until carefully constructed

120, at 633-34 (presenting written summaries of the facts); Laurence J. Severance &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurorsto Comprehendand Apply Criminal
Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 154, 161 (1982) (presenting test jurors with
videotaped trials).
252. See ELWORK ET AL., supra note 8, at 64-69; Diamond & Levi, supra note
205, at 230; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 218 (1989); Kramer & Koenig, supra note 192, at 431-32.
253. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
254. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 77, at 511-12 (revealing data regarding
frequency of jury requests and documenting that more than half of all requests in the
cases they studied concerned questions on the law).
255. See B. Michael Dann, From the Bench: Freethe Jury,23 LMG., Fall 1996,
at 5; Power, supra note 168, at 99-103 (stating that the comprehension "problem is
particularly severe with respect to the reasonable doubt standard" and discussing studies
showing that jurors made frequent requests for clarification of that standard).
256. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (holding that "a jury is
presumed to understand a judge's answer to its question").
257. See United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1978) (explaining
that answers in language similar to that in the question run the risk of favoring one party).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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answers to predictable questions are empirically tested." 8 No trial court can ever
be armed with prepared and tested answers to every question that might be
asked. Nevertheless, an examination of frequently asked questions along with
consideration of which instructions tend to be complex or confusing should be
useful to any body seeking to prepare pattern answers. At the very least, the
practice of simply rereading the instructions should be abandoned in favor of
furnishing direct answers." 9 In the absence of pattern explanations, counsel can
be consulted regarding an appropriate and correct response.
V. CONCLUSION AND A NOTE ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY
New and linguistically superior pattern instructions, empirical tests,
revisions and retests can hardly be accomplished overnight. Realistically
speaking, even thoughtfully drafted and tested instructions will be imperfect.
More to the point, there is no doubt that new, improved and tested instructions
will still be challenged as confusing or ambiguous. What should the role of the
judiciary be when faced with a claim that a jury instruction was unacceptably
confusing? If the response to date-the jury instruction presumption 26 -is to
be discarded, what should take its place?
There should be room in appellate and post-conviction litigation for
preserved2 6' claims that particular instructions are incomprehensible. 62 Such

258. I do not imply that there can never be acceptable legal presumptions without
empirical evidence as to their validity. To the contrary, sound presumptions are often
based upon logic, history or perceived experience. See supranote 174 and accompanying
text. When it comes to pattern jury instructions, however, where history, logic and
experience discredit the presumption, it seems eminently reasonable to require empirical
proof before re-establishing a presumption of comprehension.
259. See generallyLieberman & Sales, supra note 58, at 636 (summarizing studies
regarding requests for help by deliberating juries and typical responses).
260. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
261. Claims that an instruction is unnecessarily confusing or incomprehensible
should first be raised in the trial court. Challenges to anticipated instructions can be
made even at the pre-trial stage and claims regarding unanticipated instructions can be
raised prior to the commencement of deliberations. Evidence, empirical or otherwise,
that instructions are faulty should first be considered by the trial judge who may be
persuaded to modify the instruction. This is not significantly different from the routine
consideration by trial courts of instructions proffered by a party or of claims that an
instruction is erroneous.
262. These claims are, in actuality, claims of federal constitutional violations.
Depending upon the particular instruction in question, a jury's inability to understand
could deprive a defendant of important rights such as the right to remain silent, see 8TH
CIR. MODEL JURY INSTR.- CRIM. 4.01 (2003) (instruction regarding the defendant's failure
to testify), the right to due process of law, id. at 3.09, 3.11 (instructions regarding burden
and standard of proof), and the right to have certain forms of evidence considered by the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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claims should be fairly considered and should not be dismissed on the grounds
that jurors are presumed to understand. 63 For good reasons, fair consideration
should include the receipt of empirical evidence gathered by social scientists.
Needless to say, such evidence should not be accepted at face value nor should
it be deemed conclusive. But the judiciary, assisted by arguments of counsel, is
well-equipped to assess the persuasiveness of such evidence. 2" Without the
benefit of empirical research, judges, most of whom lack expertise in linguistics,
are left to make almost instinctual judgments on comprehensibility. Sometimes
confusing instructions can be logically identified,2 6' but other times it is far more
difficult. 2"

jury, see Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1990) (reiterating that the Eighth
Amendment guarantees capital defendants the right to have a jury consider all relevant
mitigating evidence). Moreover all comprehensibility claims involve an alleged
interference with a criminal defendant's right to a trial byjury. See U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
263. See Schwarzer, supra note 238, at 758 (arguing that appellate courts should
review "even technically correct instructions... with an eye to their comprehensibility").
264. See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700,705-07 (7th Cir. 1993) (evaluating and
rejecting findings of jury comprehension study); cf. Tanford, The Limits of Scientific
Jurisprudence,supra note 5, at 144-50, 167-68 (exposing the Supreme Court's almost
routine rejection of empirical psychological research regarding juror behavior and
discussing possible theories to explain the Court's attitude). CompareBallew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223, 231-39 (1978) (relying on statistical studies to conclude that juries in
criminal trials must have a least six members) with Ballew, 435 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the majority's reliance on statistical studies where "neither the
validity nor the methodology employed ...

was subjected to the traditional testing

mechanisms of the adversary process").
265. See, e.g., Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 256 (2002) (deducing that
even in the absence of obvious confusion, the law was not made sufficiently clear to the
jury); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 798 (2001) (concluding that the instruction could
logically be interpreted by the jury in only one of two ways, neither of which was
adequate to allow fair consideration of the evidence).
266. See Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916 (3d Cir. 1997). In Frey,the court vacated
the defendant's death sentence finding a reasonable probability that instructions delivered
during the penalty phase were misunderstood by the jury. Id. at 923 (citing Boyde, 494
U.S. at 380). What makes this case remarkable is that six years earlier the same court
upheld very similar instructions that were challenged on the same grounds. See
Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 308 (3d Cir. 1991). Both sets of instructions
relate to whether or not the jury must be unanimous in finding the existence of a
particular mitigating factor before any one juror may consider it in their decision about
whether or not to vote for the death penalty. The law says that unanimity is not a
prerequisite. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 376 (1988). In my opinion the
instructions in Frey and Zettlemoyer were equally unclear. In any event, the following
passages from the Frey court's opinion demonstrate the need for linguists:
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8
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Perhaps a natural concern is whether judicial receptiveness to empirical
evidence on instruction comprehensibility would create a floodgate problem.
Some might speculate that, particularly in criminal cases and most especially in
capital cases, there would be great motivation to find a researcher who could
fashion a study that fimds fault with particular instructions. Once the courts
become open to these types of claims, will there be any cases in which they will
not be asserted?
There are a number of responses to this question. One is that justice
demands this investment of judicial resources. Unless and until key 267 pattern
instructions are revised, those convicted by juries receiving them should have an
opportunity to present the claim that the law was presented to the jury in an
unintelligible manner. Such claims should be no less justiciable than, for
example, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 268 or improprieties in jury
selection. 269 A second response is that giving fair hearings 270 and, when
appropriate, relief to defendants aggrieved by the use of incomprehensible
instructions might provide impetus for reform.27' As problematic instructions are
revised and empirically demonstrated to be more easily understood, we should

[Tihe relevant portion of the [Frey]jury charge emphasizes the importance
of a unanimous finding, using the phrase frequently and in close proximity
to-within seven words of-the mitigating circumstances clause.... [T]he
clause is, to the ear and to the mind, one sound bite ....
This conclusion is not inconsistent with our holding in Zettlemoyer
(where the separation was by seventeen words, and not one sound bite)....
[T]he Zettlemoyer trial court used the term "unanimously" to modify only the
term "agree" in the subsequent phrase "agree and find".... [Tihe unanimity
language in the Frey charge could only modify the term "find," and hence the
jury could reasonably have believed that unanimity was required in both its
ultimate and interim conclusions, especially given the close proximity we
have described.
Frey, 132 F.3d at 923.
267. Quite arguably each and every part of a trial court's charge is key. One would
expect that instructions that are merely superfluous would not be included. Nevertheless,
when put in the context of the entire charge, certain portions might be deemed more
important or at least relevant to the case at hand.
268. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
269. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
270. Without doubt, these hearings would involve scrutiny of any proffered
research with both sides presenting evidence and argument.
271. See Steele & Thomburg, supra note 184, at 108 (arguing that if
comprehension were an important issue on appeal, trial judges would make extra efforts
to deliver comprehensible instructions and trial lawyers, wanting verdicts to hold up,
would propose improved instructions). For a discussion of the current lack of reform in
the comprehensibility of instructions, see supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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expect far fewer opportunities for litigants to provide evidence to the contrary.
Third, we have no reason to doubt the abilities or integrity of jury instruction
researchers. 2 When respected social scientists have input in drafting and a hand
in testing revised instructions, we should expect the ready availability of studies
confirming comprehensibility-not the opposite.
Perhaps at that point a new jury instruction presumption will be justified.
For now, evidence that instructions have been misunderstood in significant
numbers should be received and considered by reviewing courts. Such evidence
should not be discounted because it runs afoul of an insupportable presumption
that it is wrong.
Finally, a note about the death penalty. Many studies of jury instruction
comprehensibility involve instructions for the penalty phase of capital cases.273
This is partly because fairness in the process is nowhere more crucial. 214 It is
also because the standards for eligibility for the death penalty, and a jury's
discretion in imposing it, are complex275 and, consequently, translating the law
into understandable jury instructions is challenging. To be sure, however, if our
system is willing to continue to tolerate a groundless presumption that pattern
instructions are understood, the toleration should not carry over to the death
penalty arena.276

272. As is true for any issue for which expert testimony is offered, jury researchers
can be cross-examined, see generallySTEVEN LUBET, EXPERT TESTIMONY: A GUIDE FOR
EXPERT WITNESSES AND THE LAWYERS WHO EXAMINE THEM (1998) (discussing and
prescribing technique for cross-examining expert witnesses), and courts can make
credibility judgments regarding the persuasiveness of the research.
273. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
274. See Lieberman & Sales, supranote 58, at 613-16 (emphasizing the importance
of providing adequate guidance to jurors during the penalty phase of a capital case). See
generally Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (recognizing that "the
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long
.... [T]here is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination
that death is the appropriate punishment").
275. See supranote 180 and accompanying text. See generallyBowers, supranote
208, at 1044-62 (discussing the constitutional issues that attend capital sentencing, the
Supreme Court's response and the delicate complexities involved); Jordan M. Steiker,
The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmakingin Capital Cases, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2590, 2603-21 (1996) (explaining the concept of "guided discretion" in capital
sentencing and exploring the problems with the instructions aimed at enabling a capital
case jury to apply it). See also Gacy v. Welbom, 994 F,2d 305, 312 (7th Cir. 1993)
(observing that the Supreme Court has "established a set of increasingly reticulated rules
for capital sentencing, including shifting burdens, unanimity on some issues but not on
others, and consideration of mitigating factors that do not appear in state statutes").
276. Cf Gacy, 994 F.2d at 312 (concluding in a capital case that juror confusion
is the result of a "convoluted set of rules" and is merely "regrettable").
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After the Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona,2" defendants in
every capital punishment jurisdiction are entitled to have a jury determine any
fact that underlies a determination of whether the defendant is eligible for the
death penalty.27 The obvious value placed by the Court on the role of the jury"'
is wholly inconsistent with a willingness to overlook evidence that, despite
instructions, the jury does not understand the relevant law.28 In addition, a jury

277. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
278. Id. at 589. Ring overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which
upheld judicial fact-finding in the penalty phase of a capital trial. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
The Ring majority believed that Walton could not survive the Court's 2000 decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court held that any fact
or facts (beyond that the defendant was a recidivist) serving as the basis for the
imposition of a sentence harsher than the statutorily authorized maximum, must be
decided by ajury upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
The Ring Court believed that to be consistent with Apprendi, fact-finding that authorized
a death sentence must be conducted by a jury. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 607.
279. In Ring the Court remarked that "[t]he founders of the American Republic
were not prepared to leave [the finding of facts necessary to support a death sentence] to
the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial
provisions of the Bill of Rights." Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (citingApprendi,530 U.S. at 498
(Scalia, J., concurring)). For an explanation of the significance of thejurytrial right, see
generally Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970) (recognizing a "long tradition
attaching great importance to the concept of relying on a body of one's peers to determine
guilt or innocence as a safeguard against arbitrary law enforcement"); and Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (pointing out that the framers ofour Constitution
included the right to ajury in order to give an accused "an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric
judge").
280. On February 3, 1997, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates
adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty in
jurisdictions that do not comply with ABA policies concerning capital punishment. See
A.B.A., 1997 Midyear Meeting, Summary ofAction of the House of Delegates, Feb. 3,
1997, at 12. These policies include the appointment of qualified defense counsel, the
availability of independent post-conviction review of capital convictions and death
sentences, the elimination of racial discrimination in capital sentencing and the
prevention of the execution of mentally retarded defendants (the United States Supreme
Court later declared that the execution of the mentally ill was unconstitutional as violative
of the Eighth Amendment in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-21 (2002)). See
A.B.A., supra, at 12-13. See generally Kara Thompson, Note, The ABA's Resolution
Callingfora Moratoriumon Executions: What JurisdictionsCan Do to Ensure that the
Death Penalty Is Imposed Responsibly, 40 AIz. L. REv. 1515 (1998) (detailing the
moratorium resolution and discussing potential responses). For an article supporting the
ABA Resolution, see Stephen B. Bright, Death PenaltyMoratorium:Fairness,Integrity
at Stake, Speaking out in Favor ofthe ABA 's Position,CRiM. JUSTICE, Summer 1998, at
29. For an article criticizing the Resolution, see Michael D. Wims, Debating ABA's
Death PenaltyResolution: Bad Process, Bad Result, CRIM. JUSTICE, Fall 1998, at 18.
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whose discretion is not guided or at least narrowed by understandable
instructions is more susceptible to making a decision driven by improper motives
"
'
such as racial bias.28
There can be no argument that trial before a misinformed or under-informed
jury is tantamount to a denial of the jury trial right. The judiciary does not deny
this; it simply presumes that juries are well-informed and, thus, all is well. After
all, a jury that we presume understands the law will do just fine. However, a
baseless presumption is no more than a dangerous pretense. Removing the
presumption will not threaten the viability of the jury system. To the contrary,
it will provide a genuine chance for a just result.

Cf Kenneth Williams, The Death Penalty: Can It Be Fixed?, 51 CATH.U. L. REV. 1177,
1223 (2002) (arguing against the moratorium movement because it "represents a
concession on the part of abolitionists that the death penalty can be 'fixed' as long as
certain measures have been implemented"). Evidence thatjury instructions regarding the
imposition of the death penalty are not properly understood by a majority ofjurors, see
supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text, provides additional justification for a
moratorium.
281. In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,319 (1987), the Supreme Court rejected
a claim that Georgia's capital sentencing process was administered in a racially
discriminatorymanner. McCleskey's petition offered the results of a statistical studythat
demonstrated racial disparity in the imposition of Georgia's death penalty statute. Id. at
286-87 (explaining the "Baldus study" and its findings of racial disparity and Baldus'
conclusion that "black defendants... who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood
of receiving the death penalty"). While the Court refused to find a constitutional
violation based upon this study, the statistics are impressive and disturbing. See also
David C. Baldus et al., RacialDiscriminationand the Death Penaltyin the Post-Furman
Era: An Empiricaland Legal Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83
CoRNELL L. REv. 1638 (1998). See generally Williams, supra note 280, at 1203-23
(proffering reasons for the view that administration of the death penalty is racially
discriminatory and arguing that the racial bias will likely continue).
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